By David Kujabi
In Gambian politics, the distance between “never” and “now” can sometimes be measured in a handshake, a photograph at State House and a speech about national unity. A leader who once asked voters to stand against a government may later ask those same voters to stand with it, and when the bewildered citizen asks what changed, the answer is often delivered in the language of stability and development. Those are worthy aims, certainly, but they cannot be expected to explain every change of political heart.
We have seen the power of an alliance before. In 2016, seven opposition parties and an independent candidate united behind Adama Barrow to end Yahya Jammeh’s rule and begin a transition that would reform the institutions of the state. Their agreement envisaged a three-year transitional presidency. A decade later, President Barrow is seeking a third term in the election scheduled for 5 December 2026, while the art of coalition building, once used to remove an incumbent, is being used to help retain one.
That reversal deserves examination without pretending that parties must remain enemies forever. Politics requires negotiation, and former opponents may discover genuine common ground. The question is whether the people who lent these parties their votes have been told where that common ground lies, what was agreed upon and what, if anything, was surrendered to reach it.
The NPP-led alliance has acquired partners in stages. Mai Ahmad Fatty brought the Gambia Moral Congress into the fold in December 2024; Dr Ismaila Ceesay, whose Citizens’ Alliance had already drawn closer to the government, formally endorsed Barrow in January 2026; and Mama Kandeh signed an agreement on behalf of the Gambia Democratic Congress at State House in July. The APRC leader, Fabakary Tombong Jatta, announced a renewed alliance in August, while Essa Faal of APP-Sobeyaa joined the growing company in September. Henry Gomez and his GPDP had already aligned with the NPP, and Hamat Bah’s National Reconciliation Party has remained a partner of the President throughout his time in office.
Mr Bah’s place in this story is particularly instructive, because he was also part of Coalition 2016 and has served in Barrow’s cabinet since February 2017. In January this year, he told an NRP rally that his own presidential ambition “remains solid and firm,” even as he pledged support for Barrow’s re-election. An ambition can remain firm while its timetable becomes remarkably flexible, but voters are entitled to know the political bargain behind that flexibility.
Across the field, opposition parties have formed at least three groupings: the Gambia First Coalition led by Ousainu Darboe, Coalition 2026 led by Talib Bensouda, and a Team Gambia grand coalition coordinated by veterans of PDOIS. Whether any of these formations can turn shared dissatisfaction into a coherent governing programme remains their own test. For now, the shape of the contest is clear enough: a broad alliance around the incumbent faces an opposition whose strength is divided among several camps.
The electoral arithmetic helps explain why these alliances matter. In the 2021 presidential election, Barrow received 53.23 per cent of the vote, while Kandeh received 12.32 per cent and Faal 2.00 per cent. Those figures do not mean that every voter who supported Kandeh or Faal will follow them into the NPP camp; citizens have minds of their own, however inconvenient that may be for party leaders. They do mean that figures who once sought votes as alternatives to Barrow are now asking their supporters to help return him to office, and that change calls for a more substantial explanation than a smiling group portrait.
What became of the promises?
To ask that question is to return to 2016, when the coalition’s promise was larger than an electoral victory. It spoke to the possibility of a new constitution, limits on presidential power, accountability for crimes committed under Jammeh and reform of the security sector. In December 2016, Mr Bah said that a commission of inquiry into Jammeh and his regime would be among the coalition’s first actions. Today, his party campaigns alongside the APRC, Jammeh’s former party, while the work of transitional justice remains unfinished.
There may be a case for reconciliation across that political divide, but reconciliation cannot mean asking victims to keep their questions to themselves while leaders make peace under the television lights. If the governing alliance believes its partnership with the APRC strengthens the pursuit of justice, it should explain how. If it has agreed on a different course, Gambians deserve to hear that plainly too.
Presidential term limits raise a similarly unavoidable question. The 1997 Constitution sets no limit, while successive attempts to adopt a new constitution have failed, including the rejection of the Constitution (Promulgation) Bill 2024 by the National Assembly in July 2025. Some of the leaders now supporting a third Barrow term once treated term limits as essential to the democratic transition. They are free to change their position, but changing a principle requires an argument, especially when the principle concerns how long one person may hold the most powerful office in the land.
Instead, the public hears much about development, unity and stability. These words have their place, and no serious observer should dismiss the importance of roads, services or peaceful politics. Yet a road does not answer a question about constitutional restraint, just as a speech on unity does not tell a victim when an accepted TRRC recommendation will be implemented. A democracy should be capable of discussing development and accountability in the same breath.
The difficulty with judging these alliances is that their terms are largely beyond public view. In 2022, Dr Ceesay said the Citizens’ Alliance partnership with the NPP was “yet to be on paper.” The terms of the APP-Sobeyaa arrangement have likewise not been disclosed. Kerr Fatou reported claims that discussions involving Mr Faal covered a land allocation, a deposit refund and diplomatic postings for associates, while making clear that those claims had not been independently verified. Mr Faal has denied seeking a position or receiving money.
Unverified claims should not be promoted into facts merely because they make a good story. They do, however, illustrate the cost of secrecy: when parties leave an agreement in the shadows, speculation rushes in to furnish the room. Publishing the terms would allow voters to judge the alliance on what its leaders actually agreed, rather than on rumours about what they might have discussed.
That need for openness extends beyond one party. The Supreme Court ruled in July 2026 that the removal of the Auditor General in September 2025 was unconstitutional, while the Anti-Corruption Commission had still not been made operational by June 2026, according to the Edward Francis Small Centre for Rights and Justice. At a time when independent oversight requires public attention, citizens need to know whether parties entering the governing alliance have secured commitments on these matters or have simply decided to stop pressing them.
Party leaders are not the only people entitled to a view of their parties’ direction. When the GDC considered its NPP alliance in July, four executives walked out of the meeting that approved it. Omar Ceesay subsequently resigned, saying that no president should serve more than two terms, and Ebrima Nyang also left, objecting to what he described as an alliance that put power ahead of progress.
APP-Sobeyaa has faced its own dispute. Founding members, including Deputy Party Leader Maila Touray, rejected the NPP alliance and questioned whether the decision followed the party’s constitution; the leadership responded that its National Executive had consulted regional chairs and voted in favour. Within Citizens’ Alliance, co-founder Kebba Ceesay had already departed after describing its alignment with Barrow’s government as a betrayal of the opposition alternative it was founded to offer.
These disagreements do not, by themselves, prove that an alliance is wrong or that its procedures were breached. They show that the decisions are contested by people who helped build the parties concerned, which makes the question of internal consent impossible to wave away. Who took each decision, under which party rule, after what consultation, and with access to what proposed terms? A party that asks to govern democratically should be able to answer how it governs itself.
There is also a small lesson in political memory. In 2022, the GDC’s National Youth President, MC Cham Jr., condemned the Citizens’ Alliance partnership with the NPP as a betrayal of principle. Four years later, the GDC chose an alliance with the same party. The point is not to demand that political judgments remain frozen in time, but to remember that yesterday’s argument does not become foolish simply because today’s seating arrangement has changed.
Gambians need to know why
Voters and party members should not have to rely on rumour to understand why their leaders have changed sides. The parties in the NPP-led alliance can settle the matter by publishing their alliance agreements and by stating clearly what reform commitments, if any, they obtained in exchange for their support. Citizens, journalists and civil society can help by putting the same questions to every alliance partner and recording the answers.
Transitional justice deserves particular attention. The clearest test of this new alliance may be its position on transitional justice. The government accepted 263 of the TRRC’s 265 recommendations, some with qualifications, but accepting a recommendation and carrying it out are different acts. In its Third Status Report, the National Human Rights Commission found that, as of 25 May 2025, only 60 of the 304 activities in the government’s implementation plan had been completed, while 143 were ongoing and 101 had not been implemented. Important legal and institutional steps have been taken, yet prosecutions, enforcement of bans from public office and full reparations remain questions on which victims deserve dated, verifiable answers.
1. Does your agreement with the NPP include a written commitment to a new constitution with a two-term limit, and does that limit apply to the incumbent?
2. By what date do you expect the Anti-Corruption Commission to be sworn in and working, and will you make that a condition of your continued support?
3. Will you support implementation of the National Assembly report on the sale of Jammeh-era assets, including its recommended criminal investigations?
4. What funding and timetable will the alliance commit to for the Special Tribunal, the Special Prosecutor’s Office and full compensation of TRRC victims?
5. The government accepted 263 of 265 TRRC recommendations in its 2022 White Paper. Will the alliance publish a timetable for implementing every accepted recommendation before 2031, and how does it reconcile the commitment to prosecute Yahya Jammeh with its partnership with the APRC?
6. Will the alliance commit to barring from appointment in a new government every person the TRRC recommended for a ban from public office, and will it publish the list of those affected?
7. Which security sector bills will the alliance commit to enacting in the first year of a new term?
8. Was your decision to join the alliance ratified according to your party’s own constitution, and will you publish the agreement?
Coalitions are legitimate, and no politician owes the electorate a lifelong feud with a former opponent. What leaders do owe voters is an honest account of the commitments they have made in their name. The lesson of 2016 is that even an agreement built around a powerful public hope can lose its force once power is secured. Before Gambians applaud the latest alliances, they should be allowed to read the terms, examine the promises and decide for themselves whether this gathering serves the country as faithfully as it serves those gathered.
