Viability through multilateral diplomacy
The second front was opened on the wider world and involved limited but consistent participation in international affairs. Thus while bilateral diplomatic representation was kept to the strict minimum, The Gambia remained a member of the Commonwealth and joined the UN and the OAU. Membership of the institutions implies recognition by the international community and juridical statehood.
It is within this context that the haste with which The Gambia applied for admission to the UN could be appreciated. Besides the three agreements signed with Senegal, the second major diplomatic step The Gambia took on 18th February, 1965 was the application for membership of the United Nations. In his letter of application addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Prime Minister Jawara stated that “The Gambia, having today attained independence, wishes herewith to apply for membership in the United Nations, with all the rights and duties attached thereto.”
The Security Council Resolution 200 taken at its 1190th meeting in March 1965 recommended the admission of The Gambia to the organisation, and the General Assembly approved the country’s admission on 21st September, 1965, thereby making The Gambia the 116th member of the United Nations. For the Gambia Government, admission to the organisation such as the United Nations was part of its attempt at state preservation. This provided the government’s raison d’étre and the source of its power.
Accordingly, it became the 21st member of the Commonwealth upon independence. Admission to the Organisation of African Unity was also sought and granted during the same period making the country the 37th member of the OAU.
While membership of these organisations came with rights and privileges, it also came with obligations that developing micro-states found difficult to carry out. One such obligation was the contribution of member-states to the budgets of the organisations. A state’s contribution to the United Nations, for example, was based on an assessment of its capacity to pay, which was determined largely by national income. There were reductions for countries with low per capita income, of which The Gambia was one. There was, however, a minimum contribution of 0.04 percent of the United Nation’s budget. It was one of the peculiarities of the assessment system that the per capita assessment was higher for the developing micro-states than it was for the larger, and wealthier states.
Therefore, the high cost of UN membership proved to be a source of concern for Gambian leaders. On the day of The Gambia’s admission to the United Nations, Prime Minister Jawara pointed out to the General Assembly that “…In terms of size, population and resources, The Gambia is one of the smallest states to achieve national sovereignty and a place in the international community. This presents very special problems when a country like The Gambia finds that it is expected to contribute to the expenses of the United Nations on the basis of a minimum contribution which is out of proportion to its resources, and to join specialised agencies which assess the country’s contribution on the basis of the same minimum rates. This problem has been explained to the Secretary General, and unless a solution can be found, it may well mean that my country may not be able to participate in the affairs of the United Nations to the extent which we would wish”.
Jawara prudence in the face of limited resources kept The Gambia from establishing a permanent mission at the United Nations so that throughout the period 1965-1970, the country sent only ad hoc missions to the General Assembly. Amidst these difficulties, Senegal could act for The Gambia at the UN. However, the secretary general pointed out that this was not legally possible, and the idea was abandoned. It was then thought that The Gambia might attach a permanent first secretary to the Senegalese mission. This too was abandoned and until the mid-1970s The Gambia had no permanent representative at the United Nations. The result was that, though the country took a position on the various issues before the General Assembly, it was frequently absent from the roll-call votes even on matters important to Africa. In 1968, for example, The Gambia was absent during the United Nations vote on Rhodesia, which called for the use of force to crush the rebellion in Rhodesia, and for economic sanctions to be applied against South Africa and Portugal because of their support for Rhodesia.”
Towards economic viability
Economic viability, on the other hand, was envisaged to depend on the ability of the Gambian Government to mobilise greater international economic assistance. This became the defining objective of the Gambia’s relations with countries beyond sub-Saharan Africa. Links with UK and Europe as well as religious affinity with the Middle East bolstered the government’s efforts in mobilising assistance from these regions.
However, this objective was pursued as long as it did not compromise national and regime security. The Gambia Government broke off diplomatic relations with Gaddafi’s Libya in 1980 when the Government was convinced that, despite the economic assistance Libya was giving, relations with Tripoli represented a threat to the regime’s security.
Sir Dawda’s unifying role in the Commonwealth and the OAU
The Gambia failed to have her share of contribution to the United Nations lowered, but was able to get both the Commonwealth and the OAU to reduce the country’s contribution rate. To a large extent, this enabled The Gambia to participate actively in these organisations. Initially, The Gambia’s participation in both the Commonwealth and the OAU was directed towards saving the organisations from falling apart over the Southern Africa, particularly Rhodesian, issues, and over the dispute between Ghana and several African states.
The problem of Rhodesia, which dominated the Commonwealth conferences in 1965, 1966, and 1967, consisted in not what attitude should be taken – it was generally agreed that the Unilateral Declaration of Independence was illegal and should be replaced by a majority rule – but what action should be taken. Most African states favoured the use of force to dislodge the Smith regime, but Britain opposed this option. Several African states therefore threatened to leave the Commonwealth. In December 1965, an emergency meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers adopted a strongly-worded resolution to the effect that if the United Kingdom did not crush the rebellion and restore law and order, and thereby prepare the way for majority rule in Southern Rhodesia by 15 December 1965, the member-states of the OAU shall sever diplomatic relations on that date with the United Kingdom and withdraw from the Commonwealth. The Gambia was not present at the OAU ministerial conference, but in a statement issued in response to the OAU resolution, the Gambia Government stated that it was “…solidly and unequivocally behind any move which aims at putting an end to the illegal regime in Rhodesia and establishing majority rule. The Gambian Government does not [however] see how this can be achieved by severing relations with Great Britain at this critical stage. To do so would be to shut the door against direct negotiations with the country which is still primarily responsible for the affairs of Rhodesia. Similarly, the Gambia Government cannot see how withdrawing from the Commonwealth could hasten the solution to the Rhodesian problem. The Commonwealth, besides having an important role to play in present day world politics, is also an effective instrument for bringing pressure to bear on member countries for the solution of problems of common concern. For these reasons, it will be understood why the Gambia Government is not considering breaking off diplomatic relations with Britain, let alone leaving the Commonwealth.”
However, a closer examination of the Gambian officials mind will reveal that The Gambia’s decision not to withdraw from the Commonwealth was driven by self-interest. At the time, the Gambia’s recurrent and development budgets were dependent on outright British grant-in-aid during the immediate aftermath of independence. Leaving the Commonwealth or severing ties with London would therefore amount to political and economic suicide for The Gambia.
In the event, only nine out of the thirty-six members of the OAU broke off relations with the UK. And although the problem of Rhodesia was not solved until 1980, the rift created in the Commonwealth over the question disappeared by 1969. In that year, the Commonwealth conference saw a massive turn out of African leaders who had withdrawn their threat to leave the organisation.
The OAU, too, was virtually paralysed by a series of political crises: a quarrel between Ghana’s Nkrumah and several states of the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM) over Ghana’s alleged infringement of neighbouring territories, Nkrumah’s “maximalist” position that African unity meant “continental union government”, and the disagreement of several, mainly OCAM members, with this view, which they considered to be part of Ghana’s territorial ambition. The divergence led several states to advocate a boycott of the OAU summit scheduled to take place in Accra in September 1965.
The policy of the newly independent Gambia was to mediate in this passive but public dispute that threatened the tenuous cohesion of the OAU. Prime Minister Jawara was particularly outspoken on this issue. During a tour of the English-speaking West African Countries in June 1965, he stated at a press conference in Nigeria that if the African states, which were loudest in advocating a boycott, continued in their pronouncements, they would be paving the way for the “beginning of the end of the Organisation of African Unity.” He repeated his concern while in Ghana itself, stressing that a campaign against Ghana might lead to the disintegration of the OAU. In June 1965, the OAU Council of Ministers met in Lagos to discuss the issue of the alleged Ghanaian territorial infringement of Niger, Upper Volta, and Ivory Coast. At this meeting, The Gambia was appointed a member of the Mediation Committee that brought about a compromise between Ghana and her critics.
The OAU Summit eventually took place in Accra in October 1965, and Jawara, as head of the newest member-state, was called upon to reply to Nkrumah’s opening speech. In addition to pleading for the reduction of The Gambia’s scale of contributions, Jawara warned the Organisation to keep an eye on the tendency towards ‘the proliferation of institutions without regard to their cost or their usefulness.’ About the Rhodesian question, Jawara advised member-states of the organisation to use international diplomatic channels such as the Commonwealth and the United Nations for a speedy solution to the problem. This represented the basis of The Gambia’s policy in these organisations from 1965-1970.
