By Sheriff Bojang Jr
A new investigation finds the Kremlin’s mercenaries fuelled insurgent recruitment, splintered Mali’s junta and drained its finances. When Mali’s junta invited Russian mercenaries into Bamako in late 2021, officials promised a decisive break from years of frustration with France and the UN. They insisted the Wagner Group would turn the tide against jihadist insurgents and reassert state authority.
Three years later, Wagner is rebranding under the Kremlin’s “Africa Corps” umbrella and declaring its “mission accomplished”. However, an investigation by The Sentry finds Wagner’s deployment in Mali has been a “cascade of operational failures”, with the mercenary force becoming “increasingly reactive and violent”. Wagner brutality The deployment, the report reveals, was marked by massacres, military defeats and political fissures at the heart of the junta. From the outset, Wagner’s presence was defined as much by brutality as by counterinsurgency. Its fighters were implicated in the March 2022 Moura massacre, in which more than 500 civilians were executed and at least 58 women and girls were raped.
The Sentry’s investigators heard from Malian soldiers who said Wagner’s influence pushed commanders into excess. “Without Wagner, there would have been no Moura not this scale, not this duration, not all the dead,” one soldier said. Rather than eroding jihadist influence, Wagner’s tactics handed them fresh recruitment tools. Mass displacement in the north – 40,000 to 50,000 people fled Kidal and surrounding towns during joint Wagner-Malian offensives – deepened resentment. Drone strikes on weddings and funerals, alongside the mercenaries’ alliances with ethnic militias accused of atrocities, further entrenched divisions. Amadou Koufa, leader of Al-Qaeda’s Katiba Macina, a militant Islamist group, said in a 2024 interview that Russian brutality had spurred locals to join the fight to “defend their religion, their land and their goods”. Videos of Wagner fighters abusing Tuareg civilians also circulated online, fuelling jihadist propaganda. Tinzaouatène debacle The turning point came in July 2024 near the desert town of Tinzaouatène. A joint convoy of Malian troops and Wagner mercenaries was ambushed by Tuareg rebels from the Cadre Stratégique Permanent (CSP-DPA), reinforced by jihadists. A sandstorm grounded helicopters, leaving the force exposed. By the end, 84 Russian fighters and 47 Malian soldiers were dead. “ Without Wagner, there would have been no Moura – not this scale, not this duration, not all the dead The rout shattered Wagner’s aura of battlefield superiority. Images of Tuareg fighters posing with captured Russian weapons spread quickly across Mali and beyond. Survivors accused Malian intelligence of underestimating rebel numbers, while Russian survivors claimed their partners abandoned them mid-battle. The Sentry documents how Wagner’s relationship with Mali’s army deteriorated into mutual suspicion. Malian officers accused Russians of commandeering their vehicles, ignoring chains of command, and treating them with open racism.
“We have gone from the frying pan to the fire,” one senior officer said, comparing Wagner to France’s Operation Barkhane.
Resentment deepened after jihadists attacked Bamako’s airport in September 2024, killing more than 100 people. Wagner units, stationed nearby, reportedly waited five hours to intervene. “If you don’t pay them, they don’t move,” an airport guard told investigators. The incident exposed the mercenaries’ transactional logic: protection was conditional on payment. “Heavy-handed and poorly informed counter terrorism operations have strengthened alliances among armed groups challenging the state, caused substantial battlefield losses for Wagner, and resulted in higher civilian casualties,” said Charles Cater, The Sentry’s director of investigations. “Ultimately, Wagner’s deployment has not served the interests of the people of Mali, the military government, or even the mercenary group itself.” Junta fractures Beyond the battlefield, Wagner’s presence sharpened political rivalries in Bamako. Defence minister Sadio Camara, dubbed “Moscow’s man in Bamako”, was the architect of the deal, but the $10m monthly fee quickly drained Mali’s finances. Junta leader Assimi Goïta, facing sanctions and inflation, grew wary of Camara’s closeness to Moscow. “ As Moscow spreads its tentacles across the Sahel and rebrands under Africa Corps, it is critical to understand that Wagner was not the infallible fighting force and successful economic actor it pretended to be The chaotic environment Wagner fostered also generated “widening rifts and paranoia within the Malian military leadership”, according to the report. Oliver Windridge, The Sentry’s senior adviser for the UK and EU, warned that Western capitals may be reacting to Russia’s expansion in the Sahel with an outdated perception of Wagner’s strength. “Alternative options may also be emerging for Brussels, London and Washington to exert influence with Sahelian leaders toward better outcomes for their countries,” he said. READ MORE ‘Even the birds have fled’: In Mali, entire villages wiped off the map by jihadists The Sentry describes an “invisible web” of influence around Camara and the intelligence chief Modibo Koné, whose agency channelled payments to Wagner. Their faction has gained privileges – from new houses outside Bamako to control of lucrative military promotions – while Goïta scrambles to reinforce his own security with Turkish drones and private contractors. Unlike in the Central African Republic or Sudan, where Wagner embedded itself by seizing mines, its resource ambitions in Mali faltered. Attempts to secure concessions ran into resistance from Bamako, which has little appetite to surrender its most profitable gold assets. The sector remains dominated by firms such as Barrick and B2Gold, which contribute more than half of the state tax income. Without steady access to natural resource rents, Wagner became dependent on Russian state subsidies – a reliance that undermined its reputation as a self-financing security partner. Lessons for Africa Corps Moscow has rebranded Wagner’s African operations under Africa Corps, promising more disciplined, state-backed deployments. But The Sentry warns Mali’s experience should serve as a cautionary tale. “As Moscow spreads its tentacles across the Sahel and rebrands under Africa Corps, it is critical to understand that Wagner was not the infallible fighting force and successful economic actor it pretended to be,” said The Sentry’s executive director, Justyna Gudzowska.
The report recommends ICC investigations into war crimes, targeted sanctions against Camara’s network and renewed Algeria-led talks with Tuareg rebels. Western policymakers, it argues, should seize the opportunity to rethink Sahel strategy, as Wagner’s failures reveal vulnerabilities in Russia’s approach.
