By Ibrahim Dampha
The CepRass opinion poll deserves to be treated as a serious instrument of political analysis rather than as a tool for partisan entertainment. Its importance lies not in predicting electoral outcomes with mechanical certainty, but in systematically mapping the structure of public opinion within which political actors must operate. In this respect, it belongs to a recognised tradition of rigorous public opinion research that has shaped political understanding in many democracies.
Across Africa, Afrobarometer has long relied on nationally representative, probability-based, face-to-face surveys to measure citizens’ political attitudes and governance perceptions. Its methodology, based on multi-stage clustered sampling and careful demographic weighting, has made it a benchmark for credible survey research on the continent. CepRass operated within this same methodological family, which is, a nationally representative household survey, systematic sampling, and detailed demographic disaggregation. This alignment situates the CepRass report within a legitimate and internationally recognised research tradition.
Comparable standards are found in major Western democracies. Here in the United Kingdom, the British Election Study combines probability-based face-to-face surveys with large-scale panel data to analyse electoral behaviour. In the United States, institutions such as Gallup and the Pew Research Center rely on address-based and probability-based sampling frameworks to ensure representativeness. What unites these projects is not ideological alignment, but methodological discipline. CepRass reflects this same commitment to empirical credibility. As such, dismissing its findings without engaging its evidence is intellectually indefensible.
Read carefully, the CepRass report does not merely describe President Barrow’s electoral position. It diagnoses its underlying weaknesses. Of course the incumbent retains advantages associated with office, organisational reach, and visibility, but these advantages coexist with a pronounced legitimacy deficit. Nationally, more respondents disapprove than approve the President’s performance as head of state, with 47 percent expressing disapproval compared to 32 percent approval. This imbalance is politically significant in itself. More revealing, however, is its geographical distribution.
Disapproval is most pronounced in major urban and peri-urban areas such as Brikama and Kanifing, where strong disapproval reaches particularly high levels. These areas concentrate politically informed voters, civil society networks, media activity, and economic pressure. In comparative politics, urban disaffection of this kind is a classic indicator of electoral vulnerability. Incumbents can survive it only when challengers remain divided.
Thematic evaluations reinforce this diagnosis. Public perceptions of economic management, job creation, corruption control, and national unity are overwhelmingly negative. Almost two-thirds of respondents judge the government’s anti-corruption efforts poorly, and employment performance is rated negatively by 66 percent of respondents. These negative assessments are most intense among urban, educated, and working-age populations. The report therefore depicts not a passive electorate, but a politically attentive and performance-oriented citizenry.
From a social science perspective, this reflects conditional legitimacy. Support for the incumbent is not anchored in deep ideological loyalty. It is contingent upon perceived delivery. Where delivery is judged inadequate, legitimacy erodes. The CepRass data indicate that this erosion is already advanced in key social and geographical constituencies.
Yet dissatisfaction alone does not translate automatically into electoral change. The report is equally clear that opposition support is fragmented. Among respondents who named a preferred alternative to the incumbent, UDP leads with about 45.3 percent, followed by APRC No-To-Alliance, PDOIS, UMC, and APP/Sobeyaa. No single opposition formation commands majority support. In such a context, incumbents can prevail with a plurality, even amid widespread discontent.
Crucially, the electorate itself recognises this structural reality. Approximately 69 percent of respondents agree that only an opposition alliance or coalition can defeat the incumbent in 2026. This is not an elite narrative imposed from above. It is a popular judgement grounded in voters’ understanding of political arithmetic.
The presence of a substantial undecided and non-disclosing segment further reinforces this point. Around one-quarter of respondents in some categories either remain undecided or decline to state a preference. In electoral sociology, such voters are often viability-sensitive. They may desire change, but they are reluctant to support candidates or parties they perceive as incapable of winning. Coalitions address this problem by signalling seriousness, unity, and governing capacity.
The Gambian political system does not need to invent coalition politics. It already possesses a tested model. In 2016, a unified opposition coalition defeated Yahya Jammeh and inaugurated a new political era. That victory was not simply the product of numerical aggregation. It was the outcome of a deliberate political strategy that subordinated partisan identities to a national objective. Party colours were temporarily suspended in favour of collective purpose.
The lesson of 2016 is institutional rather than sentimental. It demonstrates that, under Gambian conditions, unity is electorally transformative. The CepRass report implicitly points back to this precedent. In an environment of fragmented opposition, high dissatisfaction, and conditional legitimacy, the rational response is to revive the logic that has already succeeded. Abandoning this logic without compelling evidence just points strategic failure.
Within this broader landscape, the early performance of the Unite Movement for Change is politically significant. Despite its recent formation, two weeks old UMC secured measurable support, including around 2 percent nationally and higher figures in some localities such as Kuntaur. In comparative terms, this is notable. New political movements typically struggle for visibility and credibility in their initial phase. Early traction suggests latent demand and organisational potential. Interestingy, the Movement was not only two to four weeks old by the time of this survey, but significant percentage found it worthy even though the questions were asked around Party line when it was and still not yet a Party.
More importantly, this development strengthens the case for coalition rather than undermining it. Without coordination, emerging movements risk becoming vote-splitters. Within a coalition framework, however, they can contribute meaningfully to a collective challenge while building long-term institutional capacity. The CepRass data suggest that ‘two weeks UMC’ represents political energy that should be integrated, not marginalised.
The broader trust environment also deserves attention. The report describes a “trust deficit rather than a collapse of trust,” with the lowest levels of confidence concentrated among urban, educated, and working populations. This pattern confirms that political legitimacy in The Gambia is becoming increasingly performance-based and contested. Authority is no longer sustained by incumbency alone. It must be continually earned.
At the same time, perceptions of electoral integrity remain mixed, particularly among youth and educated voters. This places an additional burden on political actors. Where institutional trust is limited, opposition unity becomes even more important, as fragmentation can easily be interpreted as irresponsibility or self-interest.
Taken together, the CepRass findings outline a coherent political structure.
First, President Barrow retains institutional and organisational advantages, but these coexist with net disapproval and declining legitimacy, especially in urban centres.
Second, key governance domains such as employment, corruption, and economic management are widely perceived as weak, intensifying dissatisfaction among politically influential groups.
Third, opposition support is fragmented, and the electorate itself identifies coalition as the only credible route to victory.
Fourth, new actors such as two weeks old UMC have demonstrated early political resonance that should be strategically incorporated.
In this light, coalition politics in The Gambia is not a tactical preference. It is a structural necessity. The CepRass report does not romanticise unity. It demonstrates its rationality.
For opposition leaders, the implication is clear. The central strategic task is not to debate whether coalitions are desirable in principle, but to reconstruct the political psychology of unity that defined 2016. This requires discipline, restraint, and a willingness to subordinate individual ambition to collective purpose. It also requires a deliberate effort to move beyond party symbolism and re-centre national interest.
The CepRass poll, when read seriously, is not merely descriptive. It is diagnostic. It reveals a society that is politically alert, increasingly critical, and open to change, but constrained by fragmentation. If that fragmentation persists, incumbency will likely prevail by default. If it is overcome through a credible, principled, and inclusive coalition, electoral alternation becomes structurally plausible.
In that sense, the report does not simply measure opinion. It outlines the conditions under which democratic accountability in The Gambia can be made electorally effective.
Sincerely.
Ethical Note:
The US, UK polls methodological approach were sourced from Microsoft Copilot. Due to time constraints and the need to opine within the window, I could not deeply examined via the publications in its entirety, hence the reliance on MC for a snapshot.
