US and Israeli strikes on Iran have plunged the Middle East into wider war. Retaliation, regional entanglements and disrupted trade make one outcome clear: no side will achieve an easy victory
In the early hours of Saturday morning, joint American and Israeli strikes fell on Iran. By daybreak, the Middle East had erupted into a new war. Iran was swift to launch retaliatory strikes, attacking Israel and US bases and non-military targets in the Gulf. The conflict has already killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, top military officials and hundreds of civilians. Lebanon and Iraq have been pulled into the fighting. Shipping routes in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea are severely disrupted and Iran is now targeting airports and energy infrastructure in the Gulf. Even European countries have been drawn in: a French base in the UAE and a British base in Cyprus were impacted by Iranian drones and missiles, not to mention the hundreds of thousands of European citizens stuck in the region.
The list of casualties—human, strategic and economic—lengthens by the hour. As the war widens, it is clear there will be no real victors, but some will suffer heavier losses than others. In this collective piece, ECFR’s experts give a 360-degree assessment of how key actors are positioning themselves, what may come next, and just how much each stands to forfeit.
America first?
US president Donald Trump’s objective in Iran is unclear, with competing justifications for the US attacks ranging from denying Iran nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to helping the Iranian people and supporting all-out regime change. However, this will likely be reined in by Trump’s tendency to pursue quick and visible “wins” rather than grand strategic transformations.
The president’s rhetoric encouraging Iranians to “take back” their country requires a degree of commitment which he has shown no appetite for. Even with the Iranian leader dead, complete regime change would require sustained military pressure. With this comes the risk of a wider escalation with political, military and financial costs Trump is unlikely to take on.
Domestic politics also matters. While there is a hawkish camp around the president with strong pro-Israeli leanings, there is little public support for a war with Iran and Trump may not want to let the fighting drag on in a midterm election year. Trump’s foreign policy revolution was centred on promises to end Iraq-style forever wars and regime change operations in the Middle East. Prominent MAGA influencers have publicly criticised this operation, including the costs of interception for Israeli air defences. Even restrainers (who want security to focus on the homeland) and prioritisers (who want an Indo-Pacific focus) in Vice President JD Vance’s inner circle are likely not thrilled by the president’s direction. More broadly, Trump’s decision to bomb Iran in the middle of talks has further undermined America’s credibility.
The uncertain logic of war hangs over Trump’s positioning. Iranian retaliation, the need to protect US forces, or Israeli pressure to finish the job by securing regime change could force prolonged American involvement. But if Trump’s track record is anything to judge by—including the speed at which he claimed victory in the 12-day war with Iran in June 2025, the decision to suspend operations against the Houthis once costs mounted, as well as the operation in Venezuela—his instinct will be to get out quickly. Khamenei’s assassination is the type of dramatic blow to the Iranian regime that could give Washington a quick “win” and a way out of prolonged war. Following this takedown, and the deaths of US personnel announced on Sunday, Trump said he has “agreed to talk” to Iran.
In that sense, despite Trump’s rhetoric alluding to wider goals, the most plausible endgame is for him to claim that the principal source of Iranian threat and thus regional instability is gone, that deterrence has been reestablished and to avoid the project of remaking Iran’s political order. Whether events on the ground, and the Israeli position in particular, will allow such restraint is another matter.
Iran in survival mode
US strikes pose an existential threat to the Iranian regime. Those in power believe they have no choice but to escalate in return—making this as bloody as possible, as quickly as possible—to ensure its survival. Iran is outgunned and outmatched by the US and Israel, both nuclear armed states with superior military and intelligence capabilities. But “victory” in Iran’s eyes means regime survival and resisting its adversaries to the point of exhaustion.
Iran’s security establishment, although weakened, is unwilling to surrender to US demands. They have pivoted to a quick retaliatory response to demonstrate the system has unity, command and control (although using de-centralised system for wartime conditions) and an ability to absorb US bombing. The aim is to impose enough pain on the region—and US casualties, with three soldiers already killed—to force Trump to stand down. This has led to a surge of ballistic missile attacks on Israel, putting Israel’s population on high alert and closing down the country, despite only causing limited damage on the ground. More impactful is Iran’s targeting of US military bases and wider state facilities across the Gulf, including energy infrastructure, which is already sending energy prices surging. Even though this will undo Iran’s delicate regional rapprochement of recent years, Tehran likely sees it as necessary to push the region’s pain threshold to force a ceasefire while the regime is still standing.
The shadow of negotiations will lengthen as the fighting drags on. Yet whether Iran’s new leadership will show pragmatism to make further concessions to try and end the conflict (mirroring the Venezuela outcome) remains unclear. Tehran believes it made significant concessions in recent Oman mediated talks and Trump’s rejection shows he is intent on Iran’s complete capitulation. If there is a prospect of a ceasefire, Iran could make more concessions on the nuclear file, but this war will reinforce its belief that it cannot give up its missile capabilities.
Even as Iran’s leadership looks outwards, it will also be focused on internal dynamics—especially in light of the supreme leader’s succession. Tehran will be wary of the war fuelling domestic discontent and provoking more unrest and attempts to unseat the regime following its brutal crackdown that left thousands dead in January. The regime is likely to continue prioritising tools of domestic control, where it can fall back on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and security services whose ideological commitment will likely remain strong.
Israeli hubris
While the attack was led by the US, the blueprint was Israeli. Since 1992, Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu has long called for an “international front headed by the US to uproot Iran”, selling US-led intervention as a way to unlock “enormous positive reverberations on the region”. While Israeli security officials are uncertain about what will come after Khamenei, many view any alternative—including an IRGC take-over or domestic collapse—as better than the current regime. Domestic political calculations are likely playing a large role in Netanyahu’s decision making too, as he looks to bolster his security credentials ahead of this year’s election.
Israel’s quest to become the undisputed regional power carries risks. Retaliatory Iranian missile strikes can cause considerable damage and casualties. Israel’s aggression has also wounded its regional relationships. Its September 2025 strikes on Doha alienated its neighbours, already angered by its war on Gaza, further fraying ties Israel has long sought to strengthen. However Israel could use escalating Iranian attacks against Saudi oil infrastructure to draw Saudi Arabia into closer military cooperation against Iran—a long-standing Israeli ambition.
For now, there is strong bipartisan support in Israel for the military campaign, especially with the US taking part. But Israel will likely prefer a short, sharp war given its finite military capabilities, especially its limited stock of defensive missile interceptors, and the mounting economic cost of conflict. For all its confidence, it is embarking on a potentially far longer and very uncertain campaign of attrition against Iran. Any US decision to unexpectedly end the conflict without achieving Israeli ambitions of regime change would probably have to be accepted by Israel given its military and political dependence on Washington.
Authors: Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, Julien Barnes-Dacey, Cinzia Bianco, Ellie Geranmayeh, Jana Kobzova, Hugh Lovatt, Majda Ruge, and Andrew Small of The European Council on Foreign Relations.
