By Dr Jimmy Henry Nzally
The recent tensions surrounding the Bulock border area between The Gambia and Senegal are more than a disagreement over territory. They represent the latest expression of a historical challenge that predates the independence of both countries by nearly a century. While public attention has focused on sovereignty, territorial integrity and border security, the deeper origins of the issue lie in the colonial era, when European powers created boundaries according to imperial interests rather than African political, cultural and social realities.
The boundary separating The Gambia and Senegal was not negotiated by Gambians or Senegalese. It was shaped through a series of nineteenth-century Anglo-French negotiations during the rivalry between Britain and France in West Africa. Although the Berlin Conference of 1884–85 established the diplomatic framework governing European territorial claims in Africa, the specific frontier between British-controlled Gambia and French-controlled Senegal developed through subsequent agreements, including the 1889 Anglo-French Convention signed in Paris, followed by later surveys and adjustments.
The result was an international boundary that divided communities with long-standing economic, cultural and family connections. European diplomats drew lines on maps based largely on colonial interests, often without regard for existing patterns of settlement and interaction. More than 135 years later, independent African governments continue to manage borders they neither designed nor negotiated. The Bulock situation therefore reflects not simply a contemporary disagreement but the continuing influence of colonial boundary-making.
Following independence—Senegal in 1960 and The Gambia in 1965—both countries accepted their inherited colonial boundary. This approach reflected the wider African commitment to maintaining existing borders after independence. In 1964, the Organisation of African Unity endorsed the principle of respecting inherited colonial frontiers, consistent with the doctrine of uti possidetis juris, which sought to prevent widespread territorial conflicts.
The policy had an important stabilising purpose. If every newly independent African state had attempted to redraw borders according to ethnicity, history or former kingdoms, the continent could have experienced widespread interstate conflicts. However, the same principle also preserved some colonial-era uncertainties. Where boundaries were poorly surveyed or ambiguously defined, independent governments inherited unresolved questions.
International law provides peaceful mechanisms for addressing such disputes, including bilateral negotiations, joint boundary commissions, arbitration and adjudication before international courts. The challenge is ensuring that technical ambiguities are resolved before they become political crises.
The Gambia remains one of the clearest examples of colonial geographical complexity. Extending roughly 480 kilometres inland while remaining a narrow strip of territory, it is almost surrounded by Senegal except for its Atlantic coastline. This unusual configuration was shaped less by natural geography or historical political boundaries than by European competition over trade and access along the River Gambia. As a result, cooperation with Senegal has always been a strategic necessity for Banjul.
Successive Gambian governments have adopted different approaches to managing this reality.
Under Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara, relations with Senegal were defined by regional integration and pragmatic cooperation. Jawara understood that geography required partnership rather than confrontation. Following the attempted coup of July 1981, Senegal intervened militarily at Jawara’s request to restore constitutional order. This intervention contributed to the creation of the Senegambia Confederation in 1982, an ambitious effort to coordinate defence, foreign policy, customs administration and elements of economic management.
Although the Senegambia Confederation collapsed in 1989 due to disagreements over sovereignty and institutional arrangements, it demonstrated that both countries viewed their shared geography as a potential strength rather than a permanent source of rivalry. Jawara’s approach was based on the belief that historical connections and economic interests favoured deeper cooperation.
President Yahya Jammeh inherited a different political environment after taking power in 1994. His administration placed greater emphasis on sovereignty, national control and strategic autonomy. Relations with Senegal fluctuated between cooperation and tension, with disagreements over trade, border management, ferry operations and approaches to the Casamance conflict occasionally straining bilateral ties.
Nevertheless, confrontation remained limited. Economic links, shared communities and geographical realities created strong incentives for both governments to maintain dialogue despite political differences.
President Adama Barrow assumed office following the 2017 constitutional crisis, when Ecowas intervened after Yahya Jammeh refused to accept the presidential election results. Senegal played a leading role in the regional intervention and was a principal contributor to the Ecowas Mission in The Gambia (ECOMIG) during its initial deployment.
From Senegal’s perspective, the intervention helped protect regional stability, reduced the risk of political instability spreading across its southern border and strengthened security cooperation. Within The Gambia, however, the continued presence of foreign forces generated debate about sovereignty, national security and the appropriate timeline for withdrawal. These differing perspectives demonstrate that modern Gambian-Senegalese relations involve not only diplomacy but also complex regional security considerations.
Barrow’s administration has generally emphasised dialogue, regional cooperation and infrastructure development. The opening of the Senegambia Bridge in 2019 became a symbol of this approach, improving transport links and strengthening trade connections between the two countries. Yet infrastructure and diplomatic goodwill alone cannot resolve unresolved boundary questions inherited from colonial rule.
Senegal’s own approach has also evolved over time. President Léopold Sédar Senghor supported closer integration with The Gambia and viewed the two countries as natural partners linked by history and geography. Abdou Diouf maintained a cooperative approach after the collapse of the Senegambia Confederation, while later administrations under Abdoulaye Wade and Macky Sall focused more on economic integration through transport links, trade and regional infrastructure.
Under President Bassirou Diomaye Faye, Senegal continues to balance dialogue with The Gambia against domestic expectations that national sovereignty must be protected. The central challenge remains finding a balance between cooperation and territorial responsibility.
The persistence of border tensions despite generally peaceful relations demonstrates that the issue is institutional rather than ideological. Political leaders have changed, but parts of the frontier remain vulnerable to uncertainty. Many border communities maintain stronger social and economic connections with each other than with the international boundary itself. Families, markets, farmland and cultural networks often extend across both sides, meaning that incidents involving local residents or officials frequently arise from unclear arrangements rather than deliberate aggression.
Senegal’s experience with other neighbours reinforces the importance of institutional solutions. The 1989 conflict with Mauritania, which began with disputes over grazing rights along the Senegal River, escalated into a serious diplomatic and humanitarian crisis. Yet sustained negotiation eventually transformed relations, with both countries now cooperating through institutions such as the Senegal River Basin Development Organisation and joint economic initiatives.
Similarly, Senegal’s relations with Mali, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau increasingly focus on security cooperation, migration management and cross-border challenges. These examples demonstrate that modern border governance depends less on military strength than on effective institutions, communication and shared interests.
The Bulock situation provides an opportunity for both The Gambia and Senegal to address long-standing structural issues. The two governments should strengthen the Joint Boundary Commission and complete outstanding demarcation work using modern satellite mapping, geographic information systems and historical records. Clear technical boundaries remain the strongest protection against future misunderstandings.
Border governance should also involve local communities. Traditional authorities, local councils and residents possess valuable knowledge of border realities and should participate in conflict prevention mechanisms. Regular communication between security officials on both sides would reduce the risk of minor incidents becoming diplomatic disputes.
Economic integration should remain central. The experience of regional integration elsewhere demonstrates that trade, infrastructure and shared development projects can reduce incentives for confrontation. The Senegambia Bridge is an example of how physical connections can strengthen political cooperation.
Ecowas and the African Union also have an important role in supporting technical border management across West Africa. Many disputes across the region share similar colonial origins, and preventive diplomacy is far less costly than crisis response.
Ultimately, the Bulock situation should not be interpreted as evidence that The Gambia and Senegal are moving towards confrontation. Instead, it highlights the unfinished work of managing colonial legacies in a modern African context. Gambian governments—from Jawara’s integrationist vision, through Jammeh’s emphasis on sovereignty, to Barrow’s focus on diplomacy and regional security—have all confronted the same geographical reality. Senegalese governments have similarly balanced cooperation with the responsibility of protecting national interests.
The lesson is that history remains influential, but it does not have to determine the future. The success of decolonisation will not be measured only by the achievement of political independence, but by the ability of African states to transform inherited borders from sources of division into foundations for cooperation.
If the Bulock situation encourages both countries to complete boundary clarification, strengthen institutions and deepen regional integration, it may ultimately be remembered not as another colonial legacy dispute, but as an opportunity to build a more peaceful and connected West Africa.
