By Momodou Sanneh
Context and significance of the departure
Talib Ahmed Bensouda has long been part of the UDP, serving as mayor of the Kanifing Municipal Council (KMC) since 2018 and being re-elected in 2023. In September 2025 he entered the UDP’s race to become its flag-bearer for the 2026 presidential election. Very shortly after that, he resigned as the National Organising Secretary and then announced his own movement/party (variously reported as the “Unite for Change Movement” or “Unite Movement for Change”). This is a bold strategic move: leaving the largest opposition vehicle and starting a new party signals ambition, but also risk.
What one would expect vs what appears to be happening
Given the scale of the move, launching a new platform, it would be logical to expect the following immediate steps:
A clear internal organisational structure: regional committees, membership rolls, charter/constitution, funding mechanism.
Public engagement and mobilisation: town-halls, regional tours, alliances with civic groups, diaspora outreach.
Coalition strategy: dialogues with other opposition parties or movements to secure space in national alliances.
Branding and narrative clarity: why the new party/movement, how it differs from UDP or other opposition, what its unique proposition is.
Based on reported coverage, while the new movement has been launched with some fanfare (e.g., “bottom-up politics”, recruitment claims) the visible follow through on organising structure, coalition building, and strategic alliances seems weak so far. The anticipation of action has not (yet) been matched by execution.
Possible underlying assumptions and risks
Assumption of an automatic base: It seems plausible that Bensouda may assume his popularity especially in urban Kanifing and among younger voters—will translate into a ready-made party base and instant national relevance. That is understandable but risky; local appeal does not automatically equate to national scale, and voting behaviour is complex.
Assumption of indispensability: He may believe his departure grants him leverage in negotiations (e.g., to join a coalition) because he carries “youth appeal” or a fresh alternative brand. But that belief, if over-estimated, could lead to disappointment. Other parties will judge by organisation, capacity, and negotiation power—not just by social media buzz or local popularity.
Fragmentation hazard: By breaking away from the largest opposition party, there is a risk of splitting the anti-incumbent vote or diluting opposition effectiveness. Indeed, some commentators already caution that this move could weaken opposition unity.
What needs to happen from here for success
In order for the new movement/party to avoid the pitfalls and establish itself credibly, the following should happen:
Rapid organisational build out: Establish regional and ward level offices, member registration, transparent structures, financial disclosures.
Clear articulation of policy differences and brand identity: Not just “we are fresh”, but “this is how we will govern differently, this is why you trust us, this is the mechanism for accountability”.
Coalition strategy and negotiation: Recognise that being invited “to the table” requires more than being visible—it requires bargaining power, a compelling base, and readiness to deliver. If national platforms consider bringing you in, they will evaluate whether you can mobilise votes, whether you bring organisational value, not just symbolic presence.
Translate sentiment into votes: Loud rallies and online engagement are important, but the true test is ground operations: canvassing, voter registration drives, candidate selection, local visibility, and capable regional leadership.
Avoid the “hero-brand” trap: The narrative must move from “it’s Talib’s project” to “it’s our movement, our structure, our membership, our accountability”. Otherwise, the risk of personality-led party (rather than institution-led party) is high, which often fails in new democracies when the leader falters or is challenged.
My personal view
I believe Bensouda recognised some structural limitations within the UDP: perhaps generational leadership issues, internal party dynamics, or desire for renewal. Launching his own movement is an expression of ambition and timing (with the 2026 elections looming). However, the lack of visible rapid follow-through suggests that the move may have been more emotive than strategically grounded. If he assumed his popularity alone would deliver him a ready platform, this could backfire. The opposition coalition space in The Gambia is crowded and combustible; a new entrant must act decisively to avoid being sidelined or becoming a spoiler.
It may well be that Bensouda’s “massive exit” will succeed but only if he turns the launch into sustained structural mobilisation, rather than remain at the brand/announcement level. Otherwise, the bold departure risks becoming a headline rather than a vehicle for change.
