former commander of the GNA
Every time I believe I’ve shared my final thoughts on the controversial draft constitution(s), new developments emerge. That’s why I feel compelled to share more of my opinions on the matter once again.
Understanding the intricacies of government, it seems implausible that President Adama Barrow’s administration will yield and revert to the original 2020 draft constitution, as demanded by the opposition. Such a move could be perceived as a sign of weakness. Therefore, those opposing the amended 2024 draft and campaigning for its rejection by the National Assembly and the Gambian people face a monumental challenge. After all, rejecting the government-gazetted 2024 document may leave no alternative but to continue with the 1997 constitution. While the 1997 constitution, in my view, is superior to any draft proposed and has been in effect since 1996, it still remains stigmatized and undesirable to both the government and opposition parties.
From my perspective, I anticipate that the 1997 constitution will likely remain in place, as I see no compromise that could lead to the successful adoption of either the 2020 or 2024 drafts. It would indeed be a miracle if either were to pass through the ongoing scrutiny.
Despite the prevailing intransigence, I urge all parties to approach this situation with calm, respect, and civilized reasoning. The concept of violent confrontation against the government, as suggested by some of the firebrand propagandists, should the tide turn against their favor, is the least viable solution. Maintaining peace and tranquility should be a priority for everyone, as the loss of these has always proven regrettable for both the instigators and innocent citizens caught in the crossfire.
It is now evident that the term limit is the primary sticking point in this crisis, with opposition members arguing that ten years in the presidency is sufficient, and therefore, President Barrow should not contest in 2026. I recall that this was the popular demand and the initial intention during the early days of former President Jammeh’s military government in 1994 and President Barrow’s coalition government in 2016-17. However, both governments failed to fulfill the public’s desire for a ten-year, two-term limit, despite genuine hopes from voters. Those who appeared sincerely committed to this notion before or soon after being elected have usually failed to deliver, which leaves me questioning why I should trust that the current aspirants promising the same will be any different.
It’s important to note that Jammeh and Barrow are not exceptions to this pervasive governance practice or malpractice in contemporary African politics. Leaders often ascend to power with promises of good governance, particularly on respected term limits, only to later extend their tenure as if their lives depend on it. This phenomenon is not unique to The Gambia; I could cite numerous African leaders like President Alassane Ouattara of the Ivory Coast and former Guinean President Alpha Condé who have behaved similarly, but I will focus on the situation in Senegal, our closest neighbor.
You see, the events that unfolded in Senegal during the presidencies of Abdoulaye Wade and Macky Sall are both unsettling and instructive. Wade, who rose as a beacon of hope in the opposition, convincingly vowed to reshape Senegal’s political arena, where Abdou Diouf had reigned for two decades. Wade’s pledge to limit presidential terms to two five-year stints, replacing the endless seven-year terms of the past, struck a chord with the Senegalese people, propelling him to victory in the 2000 election.
However, the hope that Wade would keep his word and differentiate himself from his predecessors gradually faded. By the end of his second term, with the backing of his loyalists, he attempted to manipulate the system and was indeed successful in running for a third term in 2012, despite the constitutional prohibition against it. Protests erupted, and security forces killed about a dozen demonstrators who opposed his bid for a third term. In response, the opposition chose to fight at the ballot box rather than confront the trigger-happy forces on the streets.
Macky Sall, who had been mentored, groomed, and appointed to various key positions in Wade’s government, broke away to form his own party. He made it clear to the Senegalese people that he would challenge Wade and, if elected, his top priority would be to enshrine the two-term limit in the constitution as an entrenched clause. Once again, the Senegalese electorate turned to the ballot box, where Sall decisively defeated Wade.
President Sall’s victory was celebrated, and as promised, he prioritized resolving the term-limit issue. He fulfilled his commitments to the Senegalese people, even writing a book to assure the nation that the matter was settled once and for all.
But mysteriously in his second and final term, President Sall began to target and prosecute every potential opposition candidate who aspired to contest the 2024 election, in a constitution that disqualified him to run for a third term. Karim Wade, the son of former President Abdoulaye Wade, was the first victim, followed by Khalifa Sall the former Mayor of Dakar. But, when President Sall orchestrated a state-sponsored scheme to criminalize and disqualify Ousmane Sonko, the leader of the PASTEF opposition party, Senegalese youth took to the streets en masse to challenge this illegal action.
Despite deploying security forces and allegedly hiring assassins who cold-bloodedly murdered over 80 protesters across Senegalese cities and towns, the resistance continued. Moreover, members of Sall’s government, such as his former Prime Minister Aminata Mimi Touré, who reminded him that the constitution disallowed him from running for a third term, were expelled, demoted, or reassigned to inferior positions.
Sall made numerous attempts to plunge Senegal into a political crisis to justify extending his stay in office beyond what was necessary. When the PASTEF party finally recognized his underhanded scheme, they decided to halt all confrontations with the state and instead took their battle to the ballot box. The humiliating defeat of Sall’s party by PASTEF in the 2024 election is said to be unprecedented in the history of free and fair elections in Senegal.
This is why I believe that whether or not there is a term limit in the Gambian constitution, or whether the 2020 or 2024 drafts pass or fail, if the opposition has the right message for the Gambian people in 2026 and is confident of victory, the ballot box should be their final battleground—not the violence that some of their militants are calling for. After more than two decades in power, Jammeh was defeated at the ballot box when the political action and message to convince Gambians was effectively delivered.
The events leading up to the 2016 election that unexpectedly ended President Jammeh’s 22-year rule are still vivid in my memory and in the minds of many Gambians. Radical political activists, particularly those in the diaspora with greater freedom and resources to challenge the APRC government, deeply distrusted the country’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and its electoral machinery. The IEC Chairman, Alieu Momarr Njie, found himself relentlessly under fire—vilified, accused of corruption, and dismissed as nothing more than President Jammeh’s puppet. His detractors were adamant that he was incapable of presiding over a free and fair election. This mistrust led some radical opposition activists to consider violence as the only viable option. Significant funds were raised abroad and squandered in efforts to incite local activists to make the country ungovernable also resulting in unnecessary loss of life in failed attempts to spark an armed insurrection—all due to the suspicion surrounding the IEC. In the end, undeterred by a neglected technical glitch in the final vote tallying, the entire world acknowledged that Chairman Njie’s much-criticized commission, against all odds, delivered an election that was both free and fair. I extensively wrote about this dark era in the history of our political evolution in my new book, “Testimony of a Retired Gambian Military Officer and Diplomat” to ensure we never again return to that level of desperation and misguidance.
In the final analysis, the ongoing debate over which constitution to uphold or discard seems pointless when we’ve managed to endure nearly three decades under the so-called “abominable 1997 constitution”.
The calls for political unrest in The Gambia are once again gaining momentum among dissenters both within and outside the country. Moreover, it is unfortunate that the spreaders of doubt have resumed their deceitful tactics, urging Gambian voters not to trust the IEC and once again falsely portraying it as a tool for President Adama Barrow to rig the 2026 elections. Gambians must not be misled by such unfounded claims again in the way they did before the 2016 elections.
Nevertheless, I can so far confidently say on behalf of many Gambians that President Adama Barrow has shown greater tolerance for political dissent than most African leaders, including his predecessor, former President Yahya Jammeh. This tolerance is often mistaken—or misinterpreted—as a sign of fragility. But make no mistake, Barrow is unlikely to make it easy for his opponents to unseat him, as many of his counterparts have demonstrated. And trust me, he will not step aside quietly in 2026 either. The road ahead may be very bumpy, but the battle must be fought and won through democratic means—at the ballot box, not through violence.
Thanks.
