By Sanna Camara
A key element that defined The Gambia’s independence president, Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara’s foreign policy drive was his nationalist views and strong passion for an independent state of The Gambia, while The Gambia’s immediate neighbour pushed for the country’s integration with Senegal, Ecowas Commission President and former foreign minister Gambia, Dr Omar Touray, revealed at a public lecture held during the Christmas break in Banjul.
The lecture, which took a form of a presentation, covered foreign policy events, episodes and processes that brought out several qualities of President Jawara; qualities that enabled him to use The Gambia’s foreign policy to promote security and economic development of the country since independence through his three-decade leadership of Africa’s smallest country on mainland continent.
In 1965, The Gambia had only 11,000 wage employees; 5,700 of whom were in the public sector; and 5,300 in the private sector.
“The number of wage employees rose to 12,000 in 1970, and to 22,200 in 1975. The number of public sector employees for the same period was 7,000, and 16,400 respectively,” Dr Touray stated, citing the Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (1975/76-1979/80), giving context to his findings on the topic, “Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara: The Diplomat”.
“Our findings imply, on a more theoretical level, that all states pursue the same three foreign policy objectives: security (including regime security); socio-economic development; and norms and value entrepreneurship. States differ only in the detail ingredients of their objectives and the manner in which they pursue their goals,” the Ecowas leader said.
“What we can sum up from those accounts is that Sir Dawda was rational, popular, shrewd, pragmatic and realistic. He was also moderate, a peacemaker and a pioneer at the same time. His rationality was summed up by one of his English associates who described Jawara as being more scientific than political: he wants to look at all the facts and then come to his conclusion as if he were solving an equation – quoted in The New York Times of 18th February 1965.”
The lecture notes were entirely based on the book authored by Dr Touray. The Gambia and the World: A History of the Foreign Policy of Africa’s Smallest State 1965-1995 (Hamburg African Studies Series 9, 2000), was aimed at demonstrating Sir Dawda’s leadership qualities by going beyond stating just that, and choosing some foreign policy events, episodes and processes that shed light on the leader as a rational, pragmatic nationalist, a realist pan-Africanist, a unifier, a peacemaker, and a champion of human rights.
The Gambia’s independence in 1965
The Gambia’s quest for independence was met with a tonne of “strong doubts” as Dr Touray found out, prompting the United Nations to commission a report on its independence prospects, and a possible association that could be envisaged between The Gambia and Senegal. According to Dr Touray, the UN report outlined three alternatives: “The first was the full integration of The Gambia as the eighth Senegalese or Senegambia province. The second was a Senegambian federation in which the power of the federal government would be limited to defence and overseas representation, with complete autonomy in other aspects for the federated states. The third alternative was the establishment of a Senegambian entente where both states would remain fully sovereign.”
“For Sir Dawda, the first option was unacceptable and was not to be entertained until a long period of friendly and fruitful collaboration between the two countries had elapsed. Instead, Sir Dawda put forward proposals for political relations that were very similar to the third alternative which envisaged a confederal structure in which responsibility for defence, foreign affairs, and overseas representation would be vested. This was not acceptable to President Senghor who insisted on an arrangement that would lead to the eventual political integration of The Gambia with Senegal,” Dr Touray indicated.
In his conclusions, Dr Touray stated that it was in clear terms that President Jawara’s reaction to these proposals underscored his nationalistic credentials. At no point did the statesman plan to enter into any arrangement that would compromise The Gambia’s independence.
“The Gambia’s viability was seen to lie not in a merger of the two countries but in Dakar’s goodwill and willingness not only to respect The Gambia’s territorial integrity, but also to assume the country’s external security. Thus, for Sir Dawda, The Gambia’s viability would rest on two conditions alone: security, consisting in the territorial integrity of the country, and a strong economy. These became two most important foreign policy objectives of Sir Dawda’s government throughout his rule,” he revealed.
The security objectives, on the other hand, were pursued on two fronts: closer to home, Sir Dawda felt that good relations with Senegal were essential for The Gambia’s survival. The second front was opened on the wider world and involved limited but consistent participation in international affairs.
“These agreements were intended to bring the two states closer by establishing bilateral institutions which would widen the areas of joint activity and gradually diminish the nationalistic constraints that prevented union between the two countries. They failed to do this. For example, although in March 1965 there was little divergence between Senegal’s foreign policy and the orientation of The Gambia’s policy, by the end of 1965, The Gambia had already taken a different line from that of Senegal on issues such as the OAU Conference in Ghana and British policy towards Rhodesia.”
The lack of progress in all these areas prompted Prime Minister Jawara’s public statement on those matters towards Dakar, found in several public documents.
Gambian leaders also realised that a full implementation of the 1981 Senegambian Confederation agreements would not only have adverse economic consequences for the small state; it would also interfere with national independence and would bring about a de facto obliteration of the Gambian personality. Consequently, they dragged their feet and precipitated the collapse of the confederation in 1989.
Also, the haste with which The Gambia applied for admission to the UN could be appreciated, according to Dr Touray. Besides the three agreements signed with Senegal, the second major diplomatic steps that The Gambia took on 18th February, 1965 was the application for membership of the United Nations.
Citing the letter of application addressed to the secretary general of the United Nations, Dr Touray quoted Prime Minister Jawara stating: “… The Gambia, having today attained independence, wishes herewith to apply for membership in the United Nations, with all the rights and duties attached thereto.”
The Security Council Resolution 200, taken at its 1190th meeting in March 1965 recommended the admission of The Gambia to the UN Organisation, and the General Assembly approved the country’s admission on 21st September, 1965, thereby making The Gambia the 116th member of the United Nations.
Strategic actions on the part of the Gambian government, such as the admission to organisations like the United Nations, was part of its attempt at state preservation, providing the government’s raison d’étre and the source of its power. Accordingly, it became the 21st member of the Commonwealth upon independence. Admission to the Organisation of African Unity was also sought and granted during the same period making the country the 37th member of the OAU.
Hence, the foreign policy drive of President Jawara, as the diplomat, was based on his strong nationalist views and passion for an independent state of The Gambia, which at some point, required tactful decisions that would help preserve the statehood of this nation against the forces that wanted to see it exist as a proxy or the eight region of Senegal – these forces included the political, intelligentsia and the socio-cultural commentators of Senegal under Senghor.
