I did not have the privilege to serve under Sir Dawda Jawara. I joined the foreign service in July 1995 – about a year after Sir Dawda had left office. Therefore what is being presented is based on studies and research conducted in some 30 years. For that work, I was privileged to engage and consult with key players such as foreign ministers, permanent secretaries as well as senior civil servants and diplomats. I also had the opportunity to consult primary material that offered sufficient evidence for the thesis I have advanced in the study. To date those, our research findings remain unchallenged.
What then are the research fundings that I would like to share with you today.
Well the title of this presentation is “Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara: the Diplomat”. This is for a reason. President Jawara was The Gambia’s principal diplomat from the early 1960s up to the end of his rule in July 1994. He remained a constant factor behind The Gambia’s foreign policy even though he had never been the country’s Foreign Minister, nor sought to combine the Presidency with the Foreign Ministry Portfolio. He nominated the Minister of External Affairs, and was empowered by the constitution to nominate The Gambia’s principal representatives to foreign countries. Therefore, up to 1994, The Gambia’s foreign policy reflected Jawara’s personality, beliefs, and stance on national and international affairs.
The person
In his book Kairaba, Sir Dawda himself speaks at length about his childhood, early life, political career and life as a former president. And a number of works on the Gambia have also covered Sir Dawda’s worldview. So there is no need to rehash those here. What we can sum up from those accounts is that Sir Dawda was rational, popular, shrewd, pragmatic and realistic. He was also moderate, a peacemaker and a pioneer at the same time.
His rationality was summed up by one of his English associates who described Jawara as being more scientific than political: “He wants to look at all the facts and then comes to his conclusion as if he were solving an equation.”
As for his popularity, this was attributed to both his political style than to the hundreds of people he knew during his years as a veterinary officer. He was once quoted as saying “there is not a cow in the country that doesn’t know me.”
Alan Rake, a renowned commentator on African affairs, summed up Jawara’s shrewdness in the following terms: “…He has followed the constitutional convention of multi-party system, abiding by the rule of law, although he had been astute enough as a politician to win successive democratic elections.”
Jawara’s pragmatism and realistic approach was best captured in his own statement to the nation on the occasion of the country’s attainment of independence. “No one has to tell us we are Africa’s smallest and poorest nation…. We are very conscious that the task that lies before us is formidable; and, this being so, we are the more determined to strive relentlessly to overcome the difficulties that make the task so considerable…. Freedom will not bring miracles.”
Our intention in this lecture is to go beyond stating sir Dawda’s qualities; we would like to demonstrate them. To do that, I have chosen some foreign policy events, episodes and processes that shed light on Sir Dawda as a rational, pragmatic nationalist , a realist pan-Africanist, a unifier, a peacemaker , and a champion of Human rights. For this purpose, the following five foreign policy episodes, events and processes have been chosen :
1. The Gambia’s diplomacy in the immediate post independence years ?a. Relations with Senegal?b. Engagement in multilateral diplomacy c. Economic Diplomacy ?
2. The Gambia’s role in the Commonwealth and the OAU ?
3. Ecowas Intervention in Liberia. ?
4. The Gambia’s role in the institutionalisation of Human Rights in Africa ?
5. Policy towards Independence Movements
I must recognise that such an approach is fraught with many risks. First there is the risk of being charged with reading into the evidence rather than reading out of the evidence. Secondly, the attribution of multi-causality is another pitfall we are mindful about. The third risk is that a presentation of this nature cannot be exhaustive and this may constitute a source of frustration for some readers who may expect topics that have been excluded.
Jawara’s rational, pragmatic, nationalistic approach to the Question of The
Gambia’s viability
At independence, The Gambia’s population stood at 300,000 and GDP was only £9 million. The country was totally dependent on rain-fed agriculture, which rendered the economy vulnerable to the vagaries of bad weather, pests and commodity price fluctuation. There was hardly any industrial activity; and skilled manpower was inadequate. These difficulties accounted for the scepticism that greeted the country’s independence prospects. The strong doubts prompted the United Nations to commission a report on the Gambia’s independence prospects and possible association that could be envisaged between The Gambia and Senegal. The UN report outlined three alternatives.
1. The first was the full integration of The Gambia as the eighth Senegalese or Senegambia province. ?
2. The second was a Senegambian federation in which the power of the federal government would be limited to defence and overseas representation, with complete autonomy in other aspects for the federated states. ?
3. The third alternative was the establishment of a Senegambian entente where both states would remain fully sovereign. ?
For Sir Dawda the first option was unacceptable and was not to be entertained “until a long period of friendly and fruitful collaboration between the two countries had elapsed.” Instead Sir Dawda put forward proposals for political relations that were very similar to the third alternative which envisaged a confederal structure in which responsibility for defence, foreign affairs, and overseas representation would be vested. This was not acceptable to President Senghor who insisted on an arrangement that would lead to the eventual political integration of The Gambia with Senegal.
Indeed President Jawara’s reaction to these proposals underscore his nationalistic credentials . At no point did he plan to enter into any arrangement that would compromise The Gambia’s Independence. The Gambia’s viability was seen to lie not in a merger of the two countries but in Dakar’s goodwill and willingness not only to respect The Gambia’s territorial integrity, but also to assume the country’s external security. Thus for Sir Dawda, The Gambia’s viability would rest on two conditions alone: security, consisting in the territorial integrity of the country, and a strong economy. These became two most important foreign policy objectives of Sir Dawda’s government throughout his rule.
The security objectives were pursued on two fronts: closer to home, Sir Dawda felt that good relations with Senegal were essential for the Gambia’s survival. The second front was opened on the wider world and involved limited but consistent participation in international affairs.
Relations with Senegal
The centrality of Senegal in The Gambia’s security architecture was accounted for largely by Senegal’s position as The Gambia’s immediate external environment. In many ways this explains the impact that students of foreign policy attribute to geographical location. During the Apartheid era, the freedom of choice and type of external relations of countries like Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland were limited because of their geographical location vis-à-vis White-dominated South Africa and Rhodesia. Similarly, the aim of Finland during the Cold War to appear as a credible neutral or achieve common political and economic policies with other Scandinavian countries had been limited, partly by historical factors, and partly by Finland’s geographical position vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union.
Thus, on 18th February 1965, The Gambia signed three agreements with Senegal:
1. An Agreement of Co-operation on Foreign Policy; and?2. An Agreement of Co-operation on Matters of Security and Defence; 3. A Convention on the Joint Development of The Gambia River Basin.
Jawara described these agreements as a “partnership based on a loose ‘entente’, regulated by treaties”. Momodou Thiam, the Senegalese Foreign Minister, said that the signature of the agreements on The Gambia’s independence day “shows you in what spirit we intend to cooperate”.
The foreign policy agreement provided for the exchange of high commissioners (initially referred to as resident ministers), and the representation of The Gambia by Senegal in third states as directed by The Gambia. It also provided for a Secretariat, and a Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs that would meet once every three months to harmonise the approaches of the parties to all-important matters in foreign affairs. The task of the High Commissioners included attendance of cabinet meetings in the country to which each was accredited, when the cabinet was discussing issues affecting both countries.
The defence agreement provided for mutual assistance in the face of any form of external threat, the establishment of a joint Senegal-Gambia Defence Committee with a permanent Secretariat, and for Senegalese assistance in training Gambian military or paramilitary units.
Under the Convention for the Development of The Gambia River Basin, the two countries agreed to set up a committee that would examine and coordinate the problems of developing the river basin.
These agreements were intended to bring the two states closer by establishing bilateral institutions which would widen the areas of joint activity and gradually diminish the nationalistic constraints that prevented union between the two countries. They failed to do this. For example although in March 1965 there was little divergence between Senegal’s foreign policy and the orientation of The Gambia’s policy, by the end of 1965, The Gambia had already taken a different line from that of Senegal on issues such as the OAU conference in Ghana and British policy towards Rhodesia.
The lack of progress in all these areas prompted Prime Minister Jawara’s statement that: “… we look forward to closer relations at all levels with our Senegalese friends; [however] I feel compelled to remark that if only they would show a greater and more prompt response to the matters that are from time to time referred to them, cooperation would be that much easier and more fruitful.”
This statement squarely placed the blame for the lack of progress towards closer association on Senegal’s side. At the time of Jawara’s address, Senegal had not ratified the three agreements, and was not to do so until April 1966.
Senegal’s initial interest in the defence and foreign policy agreements stemmed from its fear that a separate, independent Gambia could become a base from which infiltration and subversion might be directed against Senegal by Senegalese dissidents or a third state. Statements from the Gambian Government that it would not tolerate any intrigues of this nature may have gone some way towards reassuring Senegal that it had little to fear from its neighbour. This accounted for Senegal’s subsequent lack of interest in these areas. Senegal’s failure to obtain a Senegambian political and economic union also played a part in the change of policy in Dakar.
Although officially economic and development considerations lay behind The Gambia’s policy towards Senegal, the real motives were the security concerns of the small state. Senegalese goodwill and security guarantees were required to enable The Gambia to release its energy and resources for more urgent economic activities.
Gambian leaders also realised that a full implementation of the 1981 Senegambian Confederation agreements would not only have adverse economic consequences for the small state; it would also interfere with national independence and would bring about a de facto obliteration of the Gambian personality. Consequently they dragged their feet and precipitated the collapse of the confederation in 1989.
To be continued
