By Dr Abdoulie Bojang
On a birthday, offered to the Republic; in memory of a mother, written for the future.
Growth is not the absence of poverty statistics, nor is it the presence of activity in markets and ports. Growth is a decision—quiet, deliberate, and often uncomfortable—to build what a nation consumes, to add value where raw potential exists, and to invest patiently in the productive capacities of its people. The Gambia stands today not at a lack-of-growth problem, but at a choice-of-growth problem. For decades, the economy has expanded through consumption supported by imports, remittances, aid, and services with shallow domestic roots. This model has sustained livelihoods, but it has not transformed the structure of the economy. The next phase of national progress depends on whether the country is prepared to move from living on circulation to living on creation
Over the years, economic activity in The Gambia has been driven largely by consumption. Imported goods dominate household spending, remittances sustain livelihoods, aid supports public services, and tourism circulates income without consistently embedding value within the domestic economy. While this model generates short-term demand and visible activity, it does not build productive capacity. Consumption-led growth expands imports faster than exports, places persistent pressure on foreign exchange, and limits job creation, particularly for young people entering the labour market in increasing numbers. It sustains the present but constrains the future.
Production, by contrast, is the foundation of economic resilience. Countries that have achieved sustained development—regardless of size—have done so by deliberately expanding their capacity to produce goods and services that create value, employment, and exports. For The Gambia, production is not about replicating large industrial economies but about building value chains that reflect its endowments, skills, and regional position. It is about shifting from an economy that primarily spends to one that deliberately builds.
Agriculture illustrates this challenge clearly. A significant proportion of Gambians depend on farming for their livelihoods, yet the sector contributes modestly to national income and remains characterized by low productivity and limited value addition. Food imports continue to rise despite available land and labour, draining foreign exchange and exposing households to price volatility. This outcome reflects not a lack of effort by farmers, but a policy environment that has treated agriculture as a social safety net rather than a strategic economic sector. A production-oriented approach would prioritize irrigation, storage, processing, and market integration, enabling farmers to move beyond subsistence and participate meaningfully in domestic and regional value chains.
The same logic applies to industry and manufacturing. The Gambia’s small size does not preclude industrial development; it merely defines its scale and focus. Light manufacturing, agro-processing, construction materials, textiles, and basic pharmaceuticals are all feasible within existing demand structures. What has been missing is policy coherence. High energy costs, limited access to long-term finance, regulatory uncertainty, and exposure to unfair import competition have discouraged productive investment. Industrialization, in this context, is not a single event but a cumulative process that requires consistency, predictability, and strategic intent.
Services, which already dominate the economy, must also be re-examined. While tourism, trade, and finance contribute significantly to GDP, much of their value leaks out of the domestic economy. A more productive services sector would emphasise knowledge-based activities, professional services, digital entrepreneurship, and deeper linkages between tourism and local suppliers. Services can generate exports and high-quality employment, but only when supported by skills development, standards, and infrastructure that allow local firms to compete beyond domestic transactions.
Central to this transformation is the role of the state. A production-led economy does not require excessive state control, but it does require a capable and strategic government. The state’s responsibility is to create an environment in which production is rational, profitable, and sustainable. This includes stable policies, reliable infrastructure, fair regulation, and strategic use of public procurement to support domestic producers where feasible. Markets allocate resources, but states shape the direction of development.
Financing represents another critical constraint. Much of the capital circulating in The Gambia finances consumption rather than investment. Redirecting finance toward production will require incentives for long-term lending, effective development finance institutions, credit guarantees for small and medium enterprises, and mechanisms to channel diaspora savings into productive sectors. Money must be encouraged to build assets, not merely facilitate spending.
The demographic dimension adds urgency to this shift. The Gambia’s youthful population is a potential dividend, but only if the economy can absorb new entrants into productive work. Training young people for an economy that does not produce enough value guarantees frustration and outward migration. A production-driven strategy must therefore be matched with technical and vocational education, apprenticeships linked to industry, and entrepreneurship rooted in real value chains rather than necessity alone.
This argument is not political in the partisan sense. Consumption-led growth has persisted across different administrations and development frameworks, yielding similar vulnerabilities. Production-led transformation, by contrast, requires continuity beyond electoral cycles and a shared national understanding that development is built through effort, discipline, and time. The question facing The Gambia is not who governs, but what economic model it chooses to sustain.
The future of The Gambia will not be determined by how much it imports, spends, or circulates, but by how deliberately it chooses to build. Consumption can sustain an economy for a time, but only production secures its independence, dignity, and resilience. This is not a call for abrupt disruption or ideological shifts, but for a measured national commitment to create value where potential already exists. The country has the land, the people, the regional access, and the institutional foundations to make this transition. What remains is the decision to align policy, capital, and skills toward production. Growth is possible, but it must be chosen carefully, built patiently, and owned collectively. The Gambia can grow—but first, it must decide to produce.
