By Mohammed Jallow
In the theater of national discourse, few voices command as much intellectual gravitas and historical credibility as Hon. Halifa Sallah. His lifelong engagement in the democratic process, his analytical brilliance, and his capacity to influence public opinion remain undisputed. However, even the most seasoned minds are not immune to misjudgment when conclusions are drawn without full access to the facts. On the matter of the Gambia Ports Authority (GPA) concession agreement with Albayrak, Hon. Sallah’s position, though politically animated, does not reflect the operational, legal, economic, or regional realities that informed this strategic national decision.
It is essential, before diving into the core of the argument, to understand the broader sub-regional and continental port management ecosystem. The Gambia is the last country in the sub-region to enter into a port concession agreement, a point that must not be understated. From Nouakchott in Mauritania, to Dakar in Senegal, to the ports of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, all the way down to Luanda and Lobito in Angola, maritime gateways have long transitioned from purely public administration to concession based operational models, often under the stewardship of private entities or public-private consortiums. This evolution was not born out of ideological surrender, but out of economic necessity, global competitiveness, and infrastructural pragmatism. Ports are capital intensive, technologically demanding, and operationally complex enterprises. Governments across Africa, recognising the limitations of public budgets, have embraced concession frameworks to unlock investment, modernise infrastructure, and improve operational efficiency. The Gambia did not invent this model. It observed, studied, negotiated, and entered into it later than all its neighbors, and did so with strategic caution, legal precision, and national interest as the ultimate compass.
Contrary to the claim that the concession represents a forfeiture of national control, the reality is that ALPORT is not a third-party foreign takeover body. ALPORT is a jointly owned entity between GPA and Albayrak, making it a public-private partnership consortium, not an outsourced private operator. The GPA remains a shareholder, an asset owner, and a strategic partner in the management structure. The arrangement is therefore not privatisation, but partnership. And partnership, when executed with foresight and protective clauses, is not economic abdication, but economic empowerment.
One of the most powerful arguments in defense of the concession lies in comparative regional port governance. In Senegal, the Port of Dakar has been operating under concession arrangements for decades, with private partners playing a central role in container terminal operations, logistics management, and infrastructural expansion. Liberia’s Freeport of Monrovia entered concession agreements after years of infrastructural stagnation, enabling major upgrades in terminal operations and cargo handling capacity. Ghana’s Tema and Takoradi ports transitioned into concession based models to expand capacity and reduce congestion, bringing in private capital to finance modernisation. Nigeria, with its massive maritime economy, concessioned its Apapa and Tin Can Island terminals to private operators years ago, as part of port reform strategies to improve turnaround time and efficiency. Angola’s port system, particularly Luanda and Lobito, have been managed under concession frameworks to improve efficiency and attract investment. In almost all cases, these arrangements were structured to mobilise capital, modernise operations, and improve competitiveness. The Gambia’s decision to enter into concession later than all these countries is itself evidence of due diligence, not desperation.
What makes the Gambia’s concession even more defensible is not just the model it adopted, but the caveats and protective clauses embedded in the negotiation. The agreement includes provisions that ensure national interest is safeguarded, that regulatory oversight remains intact, and that asset ownership is not transferred outside of GPA. These clauses protect revenue streams, ensure compliance, safeguard jobs, and secure strategic control. They also include clear commitments from Albayrak to invest in infrastructure, improve port capacity, enhance digital systems, and increase competitiveness in the sub-region. These were not handshake agreements. They were legally binding commitments negotiated at the highest levels of government.
Furthermore, the negotiation and approval process was not conducted in secrecy, haste, or unilateral decision making. The concession was scrutinized and approved through a multi-layered governance process involving the Cabinet, the National Assembly, legal advisors, neutral stakeholders, economic experts, technical port consultants, and the GPA management itself. This alone discredits any claim that the agreement was a rogue executive decision. It was a national decision, a cabinet decision, a legislative decision, and a stakeholder validated decision.
Let us examine the economic rationale with clarity. Ports do not thrive on patriotic rhetoric alone. They thrive on investment, efficiency, modernisation, logistics, global networks, cargo throughput, maritime safety compliance, digital systems, dredging, terminal expansion, container handling equipment, berthing efficiency, cold chain logistics, export facilitation, customs efficiency, and international shipping confidence. If the Gambia were to wait for public financing alone to deliver this scale of transformation, it would take decades, not years. Concession frameworks exist precisely to bridge that gap. They allow governments to leverage private capital for public benefit while retaining ownership and regulatory control. That is the foundation of port concessions across Africa. The Gambia entered into this model not as a pioneer, but as a cautious late adopter, negotiating from a position of observation, experience, and strategic national calculation.
Since the signing of the concession, short-term achievements have already become visible in the form of investment commitments, infrastructural upgrades, improved port activity, enhanced cargo throughput systems, new equipment deployment, and stronger maritime trade prospects. Investors do not mobilise capital without confidence. Albayrak has mobilised capital because it sees opportunity in the GPA partnership. That capital has already begun translating into infrastructural activity. These are not speculative benefits. They are measurable milestones that have unfolded in a short time frame.
Beyond infrastructure, the concession has generated renewed interest from international shipping partners, logistics stakeholders, and sub-regional trade facilitators who now view the Port of Banjul as a rising competitor in maritime logistics. This is not sentiment. It is market reality. Ports across the sub-region are no longer managed purely by government entities. They are managed through concession frameworks because global maritime trade has evolved. The Gambia entered concession negotiations later than all its neighbors because it wanted to study the model first, negotiate protective clauses, and ensure national benefit, not national compromise.
Another major point that must be clarified is the claim of non-engagement. Hon. Sallah has personal knowledge of the GPA management. He has personal access to their leadership. He has political proximity to the governance actors who negotiated the agreement. If there were concerns about the concession’s intent, structure, or legal protections, the most logical and patriotic path would have been direct engagement with GPA management and concession negotiators, not public conjecture. Public debate has power. But public speculation without stakeholder consultation has consequences. It creates public alarm without public evidence. It raises doubts without raising dialogue. It amplifies uncertainty without amplifying facts.
I therefore respectfully urge Hon. Sallah to use his stature as a senior statesman to engage directly with the parties involved, particularly the GPA management and Albayrak representatives, to understand the full details of the concession agreement, including its legal safeguards, its shareholder structure, its national interest clauses, its infrastructural commitments, and its short-term achievements. This is not a call to silence critique. This is a call to elevate it. Informed critique is not only sharper it is fairer, more credible, and more patriotic.
Let us now speak about national ownership and structural integrity. ALPORT is jointly owned by GPA and Albayrak. It is not owned by a third-party foreign investor. It is not a standalone private operator. It is a consortium in which GPA retains shareholder authority. This model ensures that national interest is structurally embedded in the entity managing the port terminal. The partnership is therefore not external control, but shared operational responsibility with internal Gambian stakeholding.
It is also important to acknowledge the government’s intent. The government did not enter into this concession to impress political rivals, nor to satisfy external pressure, nor to generate headlines, nor to weaken GPA, nor to compromise national interest. It entered into it because every country from Mauritania to Angola had already concessioned its ports, and because public financing alone cannot sustain modern port competitiveness, and because global maritime logistics require investment that exceeds national budgets, and because regional trade gateways are competing for cargo throughput, and because shipping lines trust ports that modernise, and because infrastructure reform is not ideological surrender, but economic strategy, and because the GPA remains a shareholder, not a spectator, and because protective clauses safeguard national revenue, and because neutral stakeholders validated the agreement, and because the Cabinet and National Assembly approved it, and because it serves national interest, not personal interest, and because early engagement was available to critics, and because speculation is not superior to facts, and because the Gambia deserves fairness in public guidance, and because respect for institutions must not be sacrificed at the altar of political narrative crafting, and because economic reform must be defended with facts, not fear, and because the partnership has already delivered short-term achievements, and because infrastructure investment has already begun, and because ALPORT is GPA-Albayrak owned, and because national interest was the foundation of negotiation, and because regional port concessions were already the norm, and because this concession strengthens port competitiveness, and because critique should engage institutions first, and because Hon. Sallah has access to GPA leadership, and because speculation damages public confidence, and because facts restore it, and because I say this as a father, a citizen, and a patriot who refuses to see national progress mischaracterised by avoidable assumption.
Yes, political narratives evolve. Governments rise and fall. But institutions like GPA endure beyond administrations. They must therefore be critiqued with fairness, defended with facts, and strengthened with engagement, not weakened with speculation. Hon. Sallah may have interest in reshaping the political narrative as the year ends. That is legitimate in democratic politics. But legitimacy in politics does not validate inaccuracy in facts. And on this one, he has it wrong.
In closing, this concession is not the tragedy he framed. It is the strategy the country negotiated. The government did not fail GPA. It partnered with it. The Cabinet did not bypass scrutiny. It validated it. The National Assembly did not rubber-stamp speculation. It approved negotiation. Neutral stakeholders did not watch from the sidelines. They participated. Investors did not delay investment. They mobilised it early. ALPORT is not third-party owned. It is GPA/Albayrak owned. Protective clauses were not forgotten. They were embedded. Consultation was not unavailable to critics. It was simply unused. And public confidence should not be traded for political assumption.
The Gambia deserves facts. The youth deserve infrastructure. Families deserve fairness. Institutions deserve respect. Progress deserves defense. And critique deserves consultation before conclusion.
