US and Israeli strikes on Iran have plunged the Middle East into wider war. Retaliation, regional entanglements and disrupted trade make one outcome clear: no side will achieve an easy victory
The Gulf in code red
The Arab Gulf monarchies strongly opposed a regime change war against Iran, fearful of Iran targeting them in retaliation. These states have poured significant political capital into a détente with Iran over recent years. After Iranian-backed groups struck Saudi oil facilities in 2019, governments in the region learnt they could not depend on US security guarantees and sought to draw Iran into a new cooperative relationship.
For the Gulf, the US-Israeli campaign is a nightmare scenario. Iran’s coordinated missile and drone attacks have targeted both US military bases and broader Gulf civilian infrastructure, including airports and luxury hotels, AI centres and even oil installations. This directly undermines the Arab Gulf’s identity as safe global cities open to business, tourism and connectivity, as well as their economic lifeline as energy exporters. The disruption in the Strait of Hormuz by the Iranian navy also effectively seals off a major route for crucial exports and imports. They will now be fearful that oil and gas production sites and export channels could be caught in the crossfire.
Tehran appears to be wagering that widening the battleground will force Arab Gulf states to pressure Trump to halt the campaign. But this increasingly looks like it will backfire for Iran. These states may conclude that they have no choice but to join the US military campaign to block Iran’s ability to launch further strikes. They have already joined forces with European partners in defensive offensive operations. The next step might be retaliation against Iranian energy assets.
None of the plausible trajectories offer these states comfort. The end of the regime in Tehran could provoke state collapse and more instability. Having a failed state the size of Iran on their doorstep, with all of the security and migration implications, is a catastrophic scenario for the Arab Gulf. States like Oman could still try to facilitate new negotiations with Tehran to avert this, but the window for this is closing fast. Iran’s possible fall will also entrench another undesirable outcome: Israel’s aggressive hegemony in the region. With its major rival crippled, the US might disengage even further as a regional security guarantor, leaving the Arab Gulf states to deal with an emboldened Israel on their own.
An existential “axis of resistance”
Iran’s regional “axis of resistance”, notably Hizbullah in Lebanon, Shia armed groups in Iraq such as Kataib Hizbullah, and the Houthis in Yemen, have all pledged to join the fight. All of these groups see existential danger if their patron Iran collapses. They have lived off Iranian support, technical know-how and military transfers, as well as wider economic largesse, and used this backing to establish deep roots in their respective countries.
The fight with Iran is thus a fight for their own survival, too. In Lebanon, Hizbullah has already launched new missile strikes on Israel, prompting an even larger Israeli response with a new bombing campaign in the country’s south and Beirut. The group’s retaliation is likely to have been pushed by Iran’s greater control over Hizbullah since its leader Hassan Nasrallah’s death. Similarly, Iraqi militias could launch missile strikes on both Israel and American bases in the country. They are already claiming responsibility for drone strikes on a US base near Baghdad airport. In Yemen, the Houthis have said they will begin a new campaign to close off the Red Sea and the group may also attempt new missile strikes on Israel. Coordinated action by these armed groups, such as a surge of missiles to try and overwhelm Israel’s Iron Dome system, would force Israel and America to focus increased resources on their defences, including the use of limited interceptor missiles.
But the “axis of resistance” does not have enough capabilities to significantly weaken Israel and America, and they could pay a high price for attempting to show even symbolic solidarity with Iran—one that could also further devastate their home countries, as Lebanon is already witnessing. A decision to escalate in support of Iran will also weaken the groups’ domestic legitimacy at a moment when they are already on the backfoot with strong efforts by local governments to disarm them. The Lebanese government has already responded to Hizbullah attacks by banning the group’s entire military activities.
Turkey’s dilemma
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has clearly outlined Turkish opposition to the war, blamed Netanyahu for triggering it, and called on all sides to return to negotiations. While Turkey has long distrusted Iran’s nuclear and regional ambitions, Ankara has worked to prevent war by pushing regional powers to coordinate and by lobbying Washington to give diplomacy a chance.
Ankara’s calculation is not rooted in sympathy for Tehran but in the belief that war could produce something even more dangerous. Turkish officials fear the familiar risks of regional conflict: refugee flows, economic disruption, spillover violence and the possibility that instability in Iran could create new space for PKK-linked Kurdish militancy or autonomy on Turkey’s border. In response, Ankara could establish border controls to block refuges or get involved militarily to prevent self-rule for PKK-linked Kurdish groups inside Iran.
But Ankara’s deeper concern is geopolitical. What alarms the Turkish government most is not simply Iranian weakness, but the possibility of a post-war order shaped on Israeli terms. In Turkish eyes, there is an important difference between American and Israeli aims. Ankara sees Trump as a transactional actor: one who had been reluctant to go to war and may still settle for a short campaign, declare victory, and return to nuclear bargaining later this year. Israel, by contrast, is largely viewed as pursuing broader regional transformation to consolidate itself as the dominant regional power.
A fragile win for Russia
The Kremlin may benefit from this conflict in the short term. The attacks play into Russia’s oft-repeated litany of Western double standards. The killing of the supreme leader and Trump’s call on the Iranians to topple the regime reinforces Moscow’s narrative that America is a power that seeks to change governments. This will boost Putin’s narrative that his war in Ukraine is an act of self-defence against Western attempts to weaken Russia by using Kyiv as a proxy.
Russia will also benefit from America’s fixation on Iran. The concentration of US air defence interceptors (such as Patriots) in the Middle East means less are available for Ukraine. Kyiv welcomed the strikes on Iranian military targets, after its drones, arms and equipment have been used by Russia on the frontlines in Ukraine. But Russia no longer relies on these supplies much. Finally, the jump in oil prices will help fill Moscow’s war chest: every dollar gained by higher oil sales can go to more Russian military spending.
But this is where the good news ends for the Kremlin. In Iran, Russia risks losing yet another ally. And while loudly denouncing America and Israel, Moscow did little to help Iran, exposing its limited influence. Russia’s foothold in the Middle East has long relied on pragmatic ties. These could diminish if America’s campaign forges deeper links with Arab Gulf states. Instability in Iran will also have security and migration ripple effects in Russia’s own unsettled southern underbelly, the North and South Caucasus.
China’s calculated distance
Meanwhile, Iran’s other eastern partner, China, has so far confined its response to condemning the attacks and warning against further escalation. Beijing has provided modest assistance to help Iran rebuild its missile capabilities and air defences, and is unlikely to boost these in the near term, especially given Tehran’s targeting of other states in the region. China’s approach to Iran, as with many other political partners, has been to provide it with economic, political and military-industrial support while avoiding the risks that come with commitments when they are in trouble. The current situation reinforces the rationale for that model: Beijing can afford to stay out of this. And as with Venezuela, it can also comfortably absorb short-term hits to its oil supplies.
This does not mean that Beijing is at ease. The most benign outcome for China would be America tied down in another regional conflict, depleting munitions that it could have used in Asia and allowing Beijing to reap the geopolitical benefits of global unease over US power. But there is no guarantee of this, especially if the conflict is over quickly. Moreover, regime change in Iran would mean the loss of the most politically like-minded government to China in the Middle East. Washington’s actions in recent weeks have also reinforced a major US-China power asymmetry: for all of Beijing’s economic heft, when America launches military strikes and decapitates the political leadership of Chinese partners across the globe, Beijing is largely impotent.
The state of play is fluid, fast moving, and unpredictable. Each power involved will leave the war with less than it entered, but the damage will be felt unevenly. What is clear, though, is that the Middle East and beyond is embroiled in new violent upheaval and wider escalation could lie just around the corner.
European actors, even those not taking a principled stand against this war, must recognise the pragmatic self-interested reasons to contain this conflict. The spiral of violence risks dragging European interests into the fray.
Europeans cannot afford to wait and see if this operation succeeds in forcing substantial new Iranian concessions or regime change. A transition away from Iran’s authoritarian rule would be welcome, but it is not enough to just sit and hope that this will occur amid the countervailing dangerous possibilities of state collapse and wider war. European governments need to be engaged in shaping a realistic de-escalatory path now. This needs to prioritise intensified partnership with the Arab Gulf states and reaching out to both Washington and Tehran to push the two sides back to the negotiating table. Britain, France and Germany have stated that they are willing to conduct strikes inside Iran as part of defensive operations. They need to ensure this does not become a slippery slope that drags them into yet another dangerous American regime change operation.
Authors: Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, Julien Barnes-Dacey, Cinzia Bianco, Ellie Geranmayeh, Jana Kobzova, Hugh Lovatt, Majda Ruge, and Andrew Small of The European Council on Foreign Relations.
