By Sheriff Bojang Jr
From clandestine Emirati airlifts to Turkish drones and Sudanese gold moving through murky Gulf networks, foreign governments and arms brokers are propelling a war Sudan’s commanders do not control. We map the external actors – and weapons, wealth, fuel and diplomatic cover – shaping its course.
Sudan’s two-and-a-half-year war has moved far beyond a showdown between generals Abdel Fattah al-Burhan of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Mohamed Hamdan ‘Hemeti’ Dagalo of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). It has become a fully regionalised proxy conflict, driven by an expanding constellation of foreign interests, arms suppliers, covert logistics networks and overlapping strategic agendas stretching from the Gulf to the Sahel.
The major military shifts of the past year – including the SAF’s pushback around Khartoum, the RSF’s capture of El Fasher on 26 October and tightening grip on Darfur, and both sides’ rapid shift from conventional fighting to drone-led warfare – reflect the influence of external sponsors who increasingly set the conflict’s tempo, reach and lethality.
“Numerous reports indicate that the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, Russia, Egypt, Iran and Qatar have been involved in various ways in supporting the two competing military factions fighting for territory and influence in Sudan,” says Joseph Siegle, a senior research scholar at the University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies.
Some have claimed that Sudan is a glimpse of the new world order – ‘a war about nothing’ prioritising the new mercantilism, the stark self-interest and retreat of the West, together with serial failures of multilaterals such as the African Union and the United Nations.
Yet it is also a war about everything: the determination of autocratic oil-fired Gulf states to suppress any progress towards accountable civil rule in Sudan; brutal competition for the country’s mineral and agricultural resources; and the quest for a vast strategic foothold in the Horn of Africa by rival powers also targeting the wider region.
At stake for Sudanese and the continent is the economic, cultural and political pluralism that flowered so brilliantly in the wake of the revolution in April 2019 and the toppling of General Omar al-Bashir’s 30-year old regime.
Increasingly modernised battlefield
For Cameron Hudson, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the war’s scale and persistence cannot be separated from outside intervention. “This war would likely have ended long ago without external weapons supplies,” he says, noting the UAE’s early and sustained support for the RSF as particularly decisive.
When fighting began, neither side possessed drones or meaningful heavy weaponry. “In two and a half years, both forces have been completely modernised from the outside; drones, heavy artillery, armoured vehicles,” Hudson explains.
The result is a conflict that is more lethal, more dispersed and increasingly unpredictable. Drone warfare has erased the fixed frontlines seen in the early months of the war.
“External actors have transformed Sudan from a 20th-century battlefield into a 21st-century one,” Hudson says.
Real-time power plays
Sudan’sforeign backers, along with the US, are moving fast on the diplomatic front. Reporting this month suggests Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (known as MBS) personally appealed to US President Donald Trump, at Burhan’s request, to help end the war in Sudan, a move Hudson says may be “the biggest prize” the Saudis have delivered to the SAF so far.
Trump, speaking at a Saudi investment conference in Washington, said he would “start working in Sudan” after MBS urged him to intervene, admitting the conflict “was not on my charts” until the crown prince laid out its stakes.
Washington is simultaneously hardening its line on the RSF’s foreign sponsors. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that America “knows who is supplying the RSF with weapons and that this support must end”, adding that the issue had been raised repeatedly at the G7.
While he avoided naming any specific country, Rubio pointed to the Quad (the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE) as the main channel through which Washington intends to apply pressure.
The UAE, meanwhile, has softened its public messaging without shifting its underlying posture. Burhan rejected the latest Quad-backed truce proposal as the “worst yet”, accusing US envoy Massad Boulos of echoing Abu Dhabi’s talking points.
The friction underscores how contested the diplomacy has become. With Riyadh pulling in Trump, Washington pressuring RSF suppliers and Abu Dhabi under scrutiny, Sudan’s endgame is increasingly being shaped in foreign capitals as much as on the battlefield.
UAE: The war’s most influential external actor
Of all the foreign actors, analysts agree, the United Arab Emirates is the most consequential.
“The UAE is the largest external actor in Sudan, given it is the lone major sponsor for one of the sides”, says Liam Karr, the Africa team lead for the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute. “The loss of Emirati support would be a much more serious blow to the RSF than the SAF losing one of its many sponsors,” he tells The Africa Report.
Abu Dhabi has constructed a purpose-built war support architecture for the RSF, blending weapons deliveries, financial backing, political protection and a highly structured logistics network designed to avoid scrutiny.
In October, The Wall Street Journal reported that US intelligence agencies had concluded the UAE was escalating weapons deliveries, including sophisticated Chinese-made drones, to the RSF, reinforcing a militia accused of atrocities and intensifying one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.
Multiple investigations, including by Amnesty International, also confirm that the UAE has supplied the RSF with:
Chinese-made Wing Loong II and FeiHong-95 drones
Armoured vehicles and artillery
Ammunition, medical kits and man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS)
Long-range drone systems for strikes on SAF supply corridors in eastern Sudan
Logistics architecture and economic interest
Successive UN expert reports, US intelligence aerial surveillance data, Reuters and the New York Times have all linked the UAE to a highly structured transnational supply network sustaining the RSF. Yet UAE officials have rejected all these findings over the past two and a half years.
At the centre of this architecture is Bosaso airport and port in Somalia’s Puntland region where Emirati funding and security influence enable regular flights onwards to Sudan via Chad and Libya.
Flight-tracking data shows that since October 2024, 56 military cargo flights from UAE airports, including Al Ain and Al Rif, and from Bosaso have delivered weapons to al-Khadim airbase near Marj in eastern Libya. From there, the shipments are sorted at Maaten al-Sarra and then moved into the Sudan-Chad-Libya border triangle, an RSF-controlled logistics zone that feeds frontlines across Darfur and Kordofan.
“The UAE’s whole logistic network depends on countries around the region, including parts of northern Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland), Uganda and Chad,” says Siegle. “It uses these logistics nodes as part of its airbridge to fly supplies to Sudan’s western border with Chad, where it then is taken across the border into RSF-held Sudan.”
The UAE’s calculus in Sudan extends far beyond straightforward support for the RSF. Abu Dhabi now dominates Sudan’s gold economy, a critical revenue stream for both the RSF and SAF, importing more than 46 tonnes in 2023. Figures released last week show the UAE’s gold imports from Sudan reached $1.97bn in 2024, representing 1.06% of its total gold trade.
Its port operator, DP World, is also pursuing long-term Red Sea access, a strategy that dovetails with RSF ambitions along key corridors in Darfur, Kordofan and the Libya trade routes, where the group seeks to consolidate territorial and commercial influence.
“In Sudan, the UAE is the source of roughly 90% of Gulf state investments ($22 out of $24bn),” says Siegle. “These engagements span the infrastructure, energy, mining, port development, agriculture and security sectors. Among the agricultural investments is the management of 2.4 million acres of farmland in Sudan.”
In response to allegations that it is backing the RSF, the UAE told The Africa Report: “We categorically reject any claims of providing any form of support to either warring party since the onset of the civil war, and condemn atrocities committed by both Port Sudan Authority (PSA) and the RSF.”
Abu Dhabi says there has been “a marked increase in unfounded accusations and deliberate propaganda from the PSA”, arguing that such claims “actively undermine efforts to end the conflict and restore stability”.
These “escalating fabrications”, the UAE adds, are part of “a calculated pattern of deflection” aimed at shifting blame, prolonging the war and obstructing a genuine peace process.
SAF’s external network
The staying power of the SAF relies on a broader coalition of foreign states whose interests converge around Red Sea security, regional stability and preventing an RSF takeover. Egypt, Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, Iran, provide the SAF with critical support.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia
Egypt remains the SAF’s principal anchor, driven by Nile water security and Suez Canal stability. The North African country supplies intelligence, training and periodic arms shipments, while maintaining close operational links with SAF commanders.
Hudson notes that Egypt and Saudi’s support is less about weapons and more about diplomacy, intelligence and political cover. Both governments maintain regular high-level contact with SAF leaders in Port Sudan, and Riyadh has signalled interest in future investment and reconstruction.
Red Sea security is a central driver of Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s backing for the SAF. Cairo has already absorbed major financial losses from shipping disruptions in the Red Sea, including temporary Suez Canal closures triggered by Houthi attacks, making stability along this corridor an economic imperative.
Riyadh shares the concern, though for security rather than commercial reasons. It is focused on stopping the Red Sea being a conduit for weapons, drugs, people-smuggling and militant activity that could move towards the Arabian Peninsula, according to Hudson. For both states, supporting the SAF is part of a broader effort to stabilise the western shore of a waterway critical to their national interests.
Both countries, as well as the UAE, also have major agricultural stakes in Sudan. Gulf countries rely on Sudanese land and production to bolster their food security, while Egypt’s dependence on the Nile River makes stability in upstream Sudan a strategic necessity.
Turkiye
Turkiye has emerged as the SAF’s most consequential military partner. Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncı drones were central to the army’s turnaround in Khartoum, and Ankara now trains SAF drone pilots while coordinating intelligence with Egypt.
Iran
Iran’s early provision of Mohajer-6 and Ababil drones gave the SAF an essential boost, “decisive in early engagements”, says Karr. But Tehran’s role has since declined due to regional pressure and SAF’s shift towards Turkish systems.
Overlooked, critical actors
Beyond the headline sponsors, several African states play quieter but essential roles in the RSF’s logistics and political reach.
Chad remains the RSF’s primary corridor. Emirati shipments routinely transit through eastern Chad before crossing into Darfur, a pattern confirmed by satellite imagery and multiple investigations. The UAE has consistently denied any involvement.
The Khalifa Haftar-controlled part of Libya functions as a second supply artery. Cargo flights from the UAE and Bosaso land at al-Khadim airbase, where shipments are reportedly sorted and moved through Maaten al-Sarra into the Sudan-Chad-Libya border triangle.
Kenya has become a politically significant staging point in the conflict. Kenyan-labelled ammunition has been documented in RSF possession, and a Kenyan pilot was killed when his weapons-laden aircraft was shot down near Nyala in Sudan.
In February, Nairobi faced criticism for allowing RSF representatives to hold political talks in the capital, a move opponents said showed tacit support for Hemeti’s forces. The government defended the meeting as “consistent” with Kenya’s mediation role, though it came after President William Ruto hosted Hemeti at State House.
Domestic politics have added to the controversy. In February, former deputy president RigathiGachagua accused Ruto of benefiting from a gold business linked to Hemeti, allegations the government dismissed but which underscored growing unease over Kenya’s perceived proximity to the RSF.
Niger is a key trafficking hub for small arms moving into Sudan via Chad and Libya. Tribal-run smuggling networks supply Arab communities on Libya’s southern fringe.
CAR, South Sudan, Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia
A belt of neighbouring states forms the RSF’s most active supply corridor. In the Central African Republic, the Wagner Group provides arms, with more than 1,000 contractors in the country at one point and some units coordinating directly with RSF-linked networks.
To the south, the South Sudanese military is accused of funnelling fuel to the RSF.
In Uganda, a UAE-origin plane delivered assault rifles, ammunition and small arms bound for Sudan, with officials reportedly told not to inspect incoming UAE flights.
Eritrea and Ethiopia serve as entry points for small arms smuggled across the Red Sea, with the Eritrea-Sudan frontier reportedly acting as a key conduit for weapons flowing into Al-Batana in eastern Sudan.
