By Mohammed Jallow
The continued presence of the Ecowas Mission in The Gambia commonly known as Ecomig alongside the special Senegalese forces has become one of the most emotionally charged and politically consequential questions in our national discourse. It is a question that touches the deepest layers of sovereignty dignity institutional confidence and the psychological independence of a nation that has already paid a heavy price for its political rebirth. It is not a question of hostility to our neighbors nor of ingratitude to regional solidarity. It is a question of time of mandate of purpose and of the moral duty of a government to restore full ownership of the instruments of national security to its own people.
Ecomig was invited into The Gambia in January 2017 under circumstances that were extraordinary in both their urgency and their danger. The will of the Gambian people had been expressed at the ballot box yet the outgoing regime refused to relinquish power. The nation stood at the edge of a catastrophic constitutional rupture. There was the credible risk of violent confrontation within the security services and a possible descent into civil conflict. Ecowas intervened not as an occupying force but as a guarantor of a democratic transition. The Senegalese forces formed the backbone of that mission due to their proximity logistical readiness and historical military cooperation with The Gambia. Their initial mandate was clear to ensure the enforcement of the election results to protect key state institutions and to stabilize the country during the handover of power.
They fulfilled that initial mission with professionalism and restraint. The transition was executed without bloodshed. The Gambian people were spared the tragedy that has visited many nations in similar moments. That achievement deserves recognition and gratitude. Yet gratitude must never become a justification for indefinite dependency. A mission designed as a temporary stabilising force cannot morally or strategically be allowed to become a permanent feature of a sovereign state.
The fundamental mandate of Ecomig was stabilization not substitution. They were not invited to replace the Gambian Armed Forces. They were not mandated to provide permanent internal security. They were not meant to become a parallel guarantor of political order. Their presence was to buy time for reforms. That time has been given. Eight years later the essential question must be asked with honesty and courage what has been done with it and what must now be done.
The next term of President Adama Barrow if he is to lead must be defined by the full and irreversible implementation of security sector reform. Without this reform no democratic progress is secure. Without a professionalized accountable and confident Gambian security architecture no election no institution and no constitution can be protected by Gambians themselves. A state that relies indefinitely on foreign forces to guarantee its internal stability sends a dangerous message to its citizens and to its own soldiers that it does not trust its own capacity to govern and to defend.
Security sector reform is not simply about retraining soldiers. It is about redefining doctrine. It is about restructuring command. It is about ensuring civilian oversight. It is about depoliticizing the uniform. It is about merit based promotions. It is about a clear separation between loyalty to the constitution and loyalty to any individual. It is about building a military and police force that see themselves as servants of the people and guardians of the republic not instruments of fear.
The prolonged presence of foreign forces however well intentioned risks undermining that process. It creates a psychological ceiling over the Gambian security forces. It delays the moment when full responsibility must be taken. It distorts command relationships. It complicates intelligence sharing. It weakens the sense of national ownership of security outcomes. In the long term it risks breeding resentment within the ranks and within the population.
The Gambian Armed Forces have undergone significant changes since 2017. New leadership has emerged. Professional training has been expanded. International partnerships have been diversified. The doctrine of political neutrality has been publicly affirmed. The police have been restructured. Intelligence services have been reoriented. These reforms are not perfect and they are not complete but they are real. They are precisely the reforms that Ecomig was meant to facilitate not to replace.
The continued justification for the presence of Ecomig and special Senegalese forces often rests on the fear of relapse. That fear is understandable but it must not become a self fulfilling prophecy. No nation ever became strong by outsourcing its courage. The best guarantee of stability is not the shadow of foreign troops but the confidence of a professional national force accountable to democratic institutions.
The command structures of Ecomig have evolved over time. From the initial Senegalese led deployment under Ecowas authority to rotating commanders from other member states the mission has served its purpose. Yet every mission must have an end. The current command like the previous ones was never meant to be indefinite. The ethical and professional standard of peacekeeping and stabilization operations is clear. There must be a planned and negotiated exit strategy. That exit strategy must be based on benchmarks not on political convenience.
Those benchmarks should now be declared and met. They should include the full operational readiness of the Gambian Armed Forces. The establishment of a credible internal affairs and military justice system. The full civilian oversight of defense and intelligence. The secure and unified chain of command. The professional capacity to protect borders and strategic installations. The ability to manage internal disturbances without foreign assistance.
Once these benchmarks are met the relinquishing of positions by foreign commanders should proceed in an orderly and dignified manner. Joint patrols should transition to Gambian led patrols. Strategic installations should be handed over to Gambian units. Intelligence responsibilities should be localised. The final withdrawal should be symbolic as well as practical marking the return of full sovereign custody of security to Gambians.
The best practice internationally is clear. When a stabilisation mission leaves it must leave behind not a vacuum but a capable partner. That partner must be trusted by the people. That trust must be earned through transparency professionalism and restraint. The Gambian government must therefore invest politically financially and morally in its own security institutions.
President Barrow in his next term has a historic responsibility. He must lead the country from the psychology of transition to the reality of sovereignty. He must communicate to Ecowas with respect and firmness that The Gambia is ready to stand on its own. He must reassure the region that stability will not be compromised. He must reassure Gambians that their own sons and daughters in uniform are ready to serve and protect without fear or favor.
This is not a call for isolation. Regional cooperation will always remain vital. Joint training intelligence sharing and cross border security arrangements with Senegal and other neighbors must continue. But cooperation is not occupation. Partnership is not substitution. True sovereignty is exercised not by rejecting friends but by no longer needing them to hold your house together.
The time has come for The Gambia to move from protection to partnership. From stabilization to self reliance. From gratitude to confidence. The continued presence of foreign forces beyond a reasonable transitional period risks turning a success story into a question mark.
The Gambian people voted for change not for perpetual tutelage. They deserve a state that believes in itself. They deserve security forces that are trusted and capable. They deserve a republic that stands on its own feet among the community of nations.
