Coalition politics has become a recurring feature of Gambian electoral discourse, often framed as the opposition’s most viable pathway to power. As the country moves toward the 2026 presidential election, renewed speculation about opposition alliances has dominated political conversations. However, a sober analysis grounded in electoral history, voting patterns, and party organisation reveals a fundamental truth: any coalition that excludes the United Democratic Party (UDP) is electorally weak and strategically advantageous to the ruling National People’s Party (NPP).
Despite the multiplicity of political parties in The Gambia, presidential elections have increasingly evolved into binary contests. The 2021 presidential election clearly illustrated this reality. President Adama Barrow, contesting under the NPP banner, won 457,519 votes (53.2%), securing an outright victory. The UDP candidate, Ousainu Darboe, followed with 238, 253 votes (27.7%), while all other opposition candidates combined failed to reach 20 percent. This distribution of votes demonstrates that, even collectively, the fragmented opposition remains numerically inferior to the incumbent’s electoral coalition.
From a political economy perspective, the NPP’s performance in 2021 reflects more than popularity; it illustrates the structural advantages of incumbency in Gambian politics. Control over state visibility, patronage networks, and alliance-building has historically translated into electoral dominance. With the exception of the extraordinary 2016 election, no incumbent government has ever been removed through the ballot box. That transition was not the product of routine democratic competition but rather a convergence of elite defection, unprecedented opposition unity, and mass public resistance to authoritarian rule under Yahya Jammeh. These conditions are largely absent in the current political environment.
Nevertheless, it would be analytically flawed to portray the NPP as politically invulnerable. Public dissatisfaction with the Barrow administration is real and increasingly pronounced. Economic stagnation, high youth unemployment, deepening poverty, persistent corruption, and delayed constitutional and governance reforms have eroded public confidence. These grievances create political openings that a credible opposition could exploit. However, political opportunity does not automatically translate into electoral success, particularly in the absence of strategic coherence.
In this context, the UDP remains the central axis of opposition politics. Beyond presidential vote totals, the party’s dominance at the local government level where it controls some of the most politically and economically significant councils underscores its enduring grassroots strength and organisational infrastructure. Since its formation in 1996, no opposition force has demonstrated the national reach, mobilisation capacity, or electoral resilience of the UDP. Any opposition strategy that sidelines this reality is detached from empirical evidence.
At the same time, coalition politics in The Gambia is often distorted by rumor, speculation, and elite-driven narratives rather than grounded political calculation. Calls for opposition alliances frequently ignore the asymmetries of power within the opposition itself. Smaller parties, while symbolically important, lack the numerical weight to independently challenge the NPP. Even when aggregated, their electoral contributions remain insufficient to offset incumbency advantages without UDP participation.
The UDP’s own ambivalence toward coalition-building is shaped by historical trauma. The party has yet to fully recover from the post-2016 political realignment that gave birth to the NPP a party that emerged largely from within the UDP’s own support base. The Barrow–Darboe fallout remains a defining psychological and strategic constraint, reinforcing the UDP’s reluctance to support coalitions it does not lead. From the party’s perspective, coalition politics presents both opportunity and existential risk, particularly the fear of repeating a perceived betrayal scenario.
However, it would also be politically naïve for the UDP to assume that its electoral strength remains intact. Internal fragmentation and the emergence of splinter formations most notably the Unites for Change Movement (UMC) under Talib Ahmed Bensouda, have inevitably reduced the party’s numerical dominance. These shifts suggest that coalition politics, while risky, may also be strategically necessary for the UDP if it seeks a realistic pathway back to executive power.
The broader historical lesson is clear: fragmentation benefits incumbency. A divided opposition, regardless of rhetorical sophistication, lowers the electoral threshold for the ruling party. Conversely, a united opposition anchored by the UDP, structured around a clear leadership hierarchy, and driven by a coherent policy message would fundamentally alter the political landscape and pose the most serious threat yet to NPP dominance.
In sum, the notion of a viable coalition without the UDP is not merely optimistic; it is analytically indefensible. Such an arrangement would function less as an instrument of regime change and more as a stabilising force for the incumbent. As 2026 approaches, the decisive question is not whether opposition unity is desirable, but whether political actors are prepared to confront the hard arithmetic and historical realities that Gambian elections consistently reveal.
Biran Gai
