By Sheriff Bojang Jr
Analysts say the collapse of the Syrian regime shatters the myth of Russian reliability and may reduce Moscow’s capacity to deploy mercenaries to the continent as well as maintain resource extraction activities.
The fall of the government of President Bashar al-Assad over the weekend was quick and it came as a surprise. In a matter of days, a major offensive by opposition forces that started in Aleppo a few days earlier toppled him, more than 13 years after the beginning of the Syrian war following the Arab Spring.
Moscow, Syria’s biggest military ally that has shielded the regime from the opposition forces for more than a decade through airstrikes and other military interventions, could only watch as the fighters marched into Damascus and overthrew the government.
In Africa, the fall of Assad’s regime is highly likely to have significant implications for Russia’s military and logistical operations. One of Moscow’s biggest interests in Syria has been the naval base facilities on the northern edge of the sea port of the city of Tartus, which has served as Russia’s only naval foothold in the Mediterranean and a critical hub for operations extending into North Africa and the Sahel. Over the years, it has used the base as the primary staging ground for movement of mercenaries and resources between Moscow and sub-Saharan Africa through Libya.
Russia’s operations in North Africa and the Sahel, particularly those involving the deployment of mercenaries and the extraction of resources like gold, are heavily dependent on established logistical networks, says Kaan Devecioglu, coordinator of North African studies at the Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM).
The Wagner Group – now called Africa Corps – operates actively in countries such as Libya, Mali, Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo, often securing mining and other natural resource concessions in exchange for military support. The Tartus base, he says, has been a key transit and supply point facilitating these operations.
Logistical capabilities in Africa
With Assad now gone, there are growing speculations the next government will boot Russia out of the Tartus base, in retaliation against Moscow’s military support to the ousted leader and his regime over the years.
“The restriction or complete revocation of Russian access to the Tartus naval base has emerged as a strong possibility,” Devecioglu tells The Africa Report, adding it would likely disrupt the supply chains, complicating Russia’s ability to sustain its activities in Africa and the movement of personnel and resources. “Such disruptions could lead to delays, increased operational costs and a reduced capacity to deploy mercenaries and maintain resource extraction activities.”
Tartus is not only Russia’s sole warm-water port but also a critical link in its global power projection, says Federico Manfredi Firmian, a foreign policy expert on the Middle East, Africa and Russia and associate research fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI). Without it, Russia’s ability to transport military equipment and personnel to Africa will become significantly more constrained, he adds.
Geopolitical implications and alternatives
A potential loss of the Tartus base has broader geopolitical implications for Russia as it would hinder its ability to respond swiftly to developments in the region, further diminishing its influence. According to Devecioglu, it would represent a significant strategic setback, undermining Moscow’s broader objectives in Africa and the Middle East.
“This would not only affect military operations but also diminish Russia’s leverage in geopolitical affairs. Its ability to support allied governments and counter Western influence in Africa could be severely weakened,” he says. “Consequently, it is likely Russia will need to focus on developing new strategies to maintain its current standing.”
For Firmian, whose publications include Russia’s state capture strategy in Africa, from Wagner to the Africa Corps, Libya remains the most viable alternative for Russia. He however warns about security issues with that option.
In past years, Moscow has leveraged the port of Tobruk and Al-Khadim and other air bases in the parts of Libya under General Khalifa Haftar – whose forces dominate eastern Libya – to support operations in Africa. However, these arrangements, says Firmian, are precarious and ultimately depend on Haftar’s approval, adding the 81-year-old renegade general must balance Russian assistance with Western pressure, citing possible pushback from the US and other NATO member states.
Huge blow to Russia’s credibility
Russia has been expanding its footprint in Africa, offering packages including military operations through Africa Corps (formerly Wagner) to several African allies including coup regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.
However, Assad’s downfall shatters the myth of Russian reliability, says Firmian, adding the collapse of the regime in Syria sends “a clear and troubling” message to African leaders relying on Russia for security that Moscow’s commitments are not guaranteed.
“The ruling authorities in Mali, the Central African Republic, and in other countries that depend on Russian security forces may begin to question whether Moscow has the capacity — or the will — to come to their aid in times of crisis,” he says.
“The Kremlin’s preoccupation with Ukraine has already limited its ability to act elsewhere. Losing Syria further amplifies doubts about Russia’s ability to deliver on its promises, signalling to current and prospective partners that they might need to look elsewhere for support.”
But despite losing one of its most significant allies in the Middle East, Russia is likely to continue demonstrating intent and capability to sustain partnerships with African countries, especially its biggest stakeholders in the Sahel and the Central African Republic, says Beverly Ochieng, Dakar-based senior Francophone Africa analyst at the global specialist risk consultancy Control Risks.
“To counter this, the Kremlin will continue to rhetorically pledge support, sustain assurances through visits by key officials to keep diplomatic channels open, and maintain expansion into commercial ventures particularly in energy, mining and communication, which then deflects the majority of attention on bilateral cooperation being solely on the basis of security,” Ochieng tells The Africa Report.
According to her, some of the countries that have been depending on Russia for security are now looking for other options.
“In recent months, Mali and the CAR have been proactive about expanding partnerships seemingly to offset overdependence on Russian paramilitaries for counterinsurgency and even regime protection,” she says. “Mali is rumoured to have sought support from a Turkish private security firm to train its forces. CAR has also had some rapprochement with France, leading to the resumption of budgetary aid in June as this is a gap Russia has not been able to fill.”
