By Alhaji Kemo Conteh
A rigorous political analysis should distinguish between what is possible and what is probable. It would be inaccurate to state that the opposition coalition talks cannot succeed. In politics, coalitions have succeeded before in The Gambia, the most notable example being the 2016 opposition coalition that united behind Adama Barrow and defeated Yahya Jammeh.
However, there are strong structural reasons why the current 2026 coalition process faces significant obstacles and may struggle to produce a single candidate capable of defeating Adama Barrow on 5 December 2026.
The Coalition Is Being Built Around Opposition Unity Rather Than a National Narrative Reports indicate that the coalition taskforce’s primary objective is to produce a single opposition candidate to challenge the incumbent. Historically, successful political movements are usually built around:
A compelling national vision, a clear reform agenda, a broad social coalition, a recognizable leadership project. If as it is, the dominant message is: “Remove Barrow” rather than “Here is the future we offer Gambians” the coalition risks are being merely reactive instead of visionary.
In comparative international politics, many voters support incumbents not because they agree with everything government does, but because they perceive stability, continuity, and predictability.
Secondly, multiple presidential ambitions create a structural deadlock. President Barrow himself publicly argued that the ongoing coalition talks would struggle because numerous opposition leaders have presidential ambitions.
The challenge is not simply about personal ego. The challenge in these coalition talks is is political mathematics. The coalition actors involved include parties and movements associated with: UDP, GDC, ADD, NDP, APP-SOBEYAA, NDA, Unite Movement and others part taking in the taskforce process.
Each organization has a separate: leadership structure, financiers, grassroots organizers, parliamentary ambitions, and future succession calculations. The question on every Gambian’s lips, including more especially, the coalition actors themselves is; who would sacrifice their presidential ambition for who? The closer the election gets, the harder that compromise becomes.
One notable weakness is that not all opposition forces are operating under a single umbrella. For example, PDOIS publicly explained that it has been pursuing a separate “Team Gambia” coalition initiative and has not fully participated in the taskforce process.
This creates three problems: 1. Competing coalition architectures. 2. Different candidate-selection philosophies, and 3. Different organizational loyalties. An opposition coalition cannot maximize its electoral potential if major actors remain in parallel negotiations.
The opposition has not yet solved the candidate selection problem. According to recent reports, discussions continue around the process for selecting a flag bearer.
Candidate selection is often where coalitions collapse. In theory and in practice, there are (6) possible models, and we have to wait and see which one will be the dominant or decisive choice of the taskforce: Party size, previous election performance, public opinion surveys, delegates convention, consensus selection, or independent vetting panel.
Each method produces different winners. Supporters of each potential candidate will tend to prefer the method that favors their preferred candidate. The disagreement is often not about the candidate. It is mostly about the rules.
Barrow Has the advantages of incumbency. Any opposition coalition must confront the reality that it is not running against a weak first-term government. It is running against a sitting president, an established governing party, state visibility, cabinet-level networks, local government relationships, coalition partners already embedded within government structures.
The ruling alliance enters the election with organizational advantages that opposition parties must first overcome before persuading undecided voters.
The 2016 Conditions no longer exist.
Many analysts compare 2026 to 2016. The comparison is imperfect. In 2016, opposition forces united against a 22-year incumbent. There was a singular national desire for democratic transition. International attention was unusually intense, opposition voters were highly motivated around regime change.
Today, the political environment is more pluralistic, electoral competition is more fragmented, government institutions are more normalized, voters are likely to focus more on performance and policy than on democratic transition.
The emotional conditions that powered coalition 2016 are therefore much weaker today. The Coalition May Produce a candidate but they may not be able to rally around a unified campaign. This is perhaps the greatest hidden risk.
Producing a flag bearer is one challenge, producing a unified campaign is a bigger challenge. Even if a candidate emerges, enduring questions will remain: Will all leaders campaign enthusiastically? Will all supporters transfer their loyalty? Will local structures cooperate? Will financiers remain committed? Will disappointed factions stay inside the coalition?
International political history shows that coalition agreements signed at the top do not automatically produce unity at the grassroots. Electoral arithmetic alone may not be enough. A common assumption is: Opposition votes + Opposition votes = Victory. In reality, voter transfers are never automatic. If candidate A withdraws and endorses Candidate B, some supporters follow, some abstain, some defect, some remain neutral.
Coalitions frequently overestimate how transferable votes actually are. In a strategic diagnosis, the coalition 2026 taskforce appears to be pursuing a reasonable strategy: 1st. Build opposition consensus. 2nd. Select one candidate. 3rd. Avoid vote splitting. 4th. Present a united front.
The cumulative weakness in all this is that coalition engineering alone does not create electoral momentum.
For the coalition to defeat President Barrow, it must simultaneously achieve full opposition unity, a credible flag bearer, a compelling national vision, strong grassroots mobilization, financing, voter enthusiasm, effective vote transfer between coalition partners.
Failure in any one of these will significantly reduce its chances.
In conclusion, the strongest argument is not that the coalition talks cannot succeed. Rather, it is that they will face four major structural constraints: 1. Competing presidential ambitions. 2. Incomplete opposition unity, 3. Candidate-selection disputes, and 4.
The incumbent advantages enjoyed by President Barrow.
Unless the coalition develops a unifying national vision that extends beyond opposition to the incumbent, and resolves these internal contradictions quickly, which they w not be able to, it may succeed in producing a candidate but will fail to produce the broad electoral coalition necessary to defeat Adama Barrow in the December 2026 presidential election.
Alhaji Kemo Conteh is a Public Policy and Governance Consultant, and the Founder of Governance and Development Management Services (CDMS).
